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ABSTRACT
In this age of ubiquitous communication in which we can stay constantly
connected with the rest of the world, for most of the part, we have to be grateful
for one particular invention - the Internet. But as the popularity of Internet
connectivity grows, it has become a very dangerous place where objects of
malicious content and intent can be hidden in plain sight. In this dissertation, we
investigate different ways to detect and capture these malicious contents hidden
in the Internet. First, we propose an automated system that mimics high-risk
browsing activities such as clicking on suspicious online ads, and as a result
collects malicious executable files for further analysis and diagnosis. Using our
system we crawled over the Internet and collected a considerable amount of
malicious executables with very limited resources. Malvertising has been one of
the major recent threats against cyber security. Malvertisers apply a variety of
evasion techniques to evade detection, whereas the ad networks apply inspection
techniques to reveal the malicious ads. However, both the malvertiser and the ad
network are under the constraints of resource and time. In the second part of this
dissertation, we propose a game theoretic approach to formulate the problem of
inspecting the malware inserted by the malvertisers into the Web-based
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advertising system. During malware collection, we used the online multi-AV
scanning service VirusTotal to scan and analyze the samples, which can only
generate an aggregation of antivirus scan reports. We need a multi-scanner
solution that can accurately determine the maliciousness of a given sample. In
the third part of this dissertation, we introduce three theoretical models, which
enable us to predict the accuracy levels of different combination of scanners and
determine the optimum configuration of a multi-scanner detection system to
achieve maximum accuracy. Malicious communication generated by malware
also can reveal the presence of it. In the case of botnets, their command and
control (C&C) communication is good candidate for it. Among the widely used
C&C protocols, HTTP is becoming the most preferred one. However, detecting
HTTP-based C&C packets that constitute a minuscule portion of everyday HTTP
traffic is a formidable task. In the final part of this dissertation, we present an
anomaly detection based approach to detect HTTP-based C&C traffic using
statistical features based on client generated HTTP request packets and DNS
server generated response packets.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION
1.1 Motivation
Most cyber crimes can be attributed to hacking or cracking, and computer virus
or worm. Hacking or cracking falls into the category of malicious activity, in
which the cyber criminal is online to perform malicious actions. On the other
hand, computer virus or worm can be categorized as malicious content, in which
the cyber criminal first injects the malicious contents into the victim system, and
lets the malicious contents perform the malicious actions. In practice, there are
many forms of malicious contents. A majority of them is classified as malicious
software, or in short, malware. Malware is the primary and in many cases the
only weapon of attack used by the cyber criminals. They usually use it in an
intelligent way so that the victim remains unaware of the attack until very late.
This is possible for the autonomous and active nature of software objects. Other
forms of malicious contents involve some kind of malicious activity or
communication and are passive on their own. Examples of such malicious
content include botnet C&C communication, network intrusion packets, spam
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emails, etc. These passive malicious objects are created with stealthy
characteristics as well. Therefore, detection of malicious contents is imperative
for ensuring the security of most modern cyber systems.

1.2 Problem Overview
1.2.1 Collection and Inspection of Malware Hidden in Online Advertising
To develop effective detection and mitigation techniques against malware, the
first step is to develop a repository of existing malware samples for analysis and
testing. For this purpose, we need an effecting malware collection system, which
can provide us with the latest versions of active malware executable binary and
other related files from various Internet sources. In the recent past, the online
advertising system has become one of major sources of Internet malware. Over
the years, this system has evolved to become very effective in reaching and
delivering content to targeted audiences consisting of all kinds of Internet users.
Recently, cyber-criminals have started exploiting this system as an effective and
risk-free channel to disseminate malware. Many popular websites became
victims to such exploitation and have had malicious advertisements placed on
their webpages or widgets unknowingly, including Horoscope.com, The New
York Times [1], the London Stock Exchange, Spotify [2], and The Onion. The
most recent addition to this list was earlier in 2015 when HuffingtonPost website
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served malicious ads via AOL ad-network [3]. Since the cyber criminal are
already delivering their goods via malvertising, this should be a good source to
find and capture active malware samples. But we have not seen any prior work
where malvertising was considered a source of malware for collection. We want
to address this issue in this dissertation.
Most malvertisements operate with the help of a tool called exploit kit [4],
which can probe the vulnerabilities on the victim machine's web browser or
plug-in in order to exploit and install the malware. There is an expensive price
tag attached to the acquisition of these exploit kits. Moreover, in order to protect
their "investments" on malicious ads and malware from detection by the ad
network, malvertisers often apply to their campaigns a variety of evasion
techniques such as fingerprinting the execution environment, redirecting to
compromised IP addresses, and malware polymorphism (introduced in more
detail in the next section). These evasion techniques also incur considerable
overhead cost on the malvertiser. On the other hand, in order to control and limit
the huge reputation damage and financial losses caused by malvertising
campaigns [5], the ad network also spends a lot of money and efforts to apply
inspection techniques on submitted ads, including live monitoring and code
analysis. These inspection efforts also incur substantial overhead coming from
labor, infrastructure, intellectual property fee for licensing diagnosis, time

3

needed to conduct analysis, and cost for establishing partnership with other
companies for sharing of expertise and data [6]. However, we note that both the
malvertiser and the ad network are under the constraints of resource and time,
which makes it impossible and impractical for the malvertiser to always submit
malicious ads and for the ad network to inspect every submitted ad. Therefore,
the ad network needs proper guidelines to effectively manage its resources for
inspection to maximize its chance to thwart possible malvertising campaigns. We
intend to address this problem in this dissertation.
1.2.2. Maximizing Accuracy in Multi-scanner Malware Detection System
Malicious software or malware is one of the major tools of cyber attack. Every
cyber attack involves some kind of malware. Therefore, detection of malware is
one of the cornerstones of modern cyber security. For a long time, we have been
relying on the anti-malware or anti-virus scanners to detect malware and to
protect ourselves from it. Variety of anti-malware scanners have been developed
over the years with different levels of performances. In the early days, a single
scanner could detect most of the malware out there. But over time, the malware
writers and their repository of malware has evolved and proliferated so much
that no single anti-malware engine can protect us from all of them. Moreover,
researchers proved that combining the power of multiple anti-malware engines
improve detection accuracy and performance significantly. This is why we now
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have a lot of online multi-AV scanning services and tools (VirusTotal [8], Jotti,
VirScan, etc.) at our disposal.
Although we have many multi-AV scanning services and tools available,
most of them are used only for informational purposes or as a source of second
opinion. None of them directly provide an exact decision of whether a particular
sample is malicious or benign. Instead, they work as an information aggregator
and only list the individual results returned from each anti-virus scanning
engine. The responsibility of making a decision based on these individual scan
results is up to the human user. This may be convenient for personal use where
an end-user is looking for a second opinion for an unknown sample downloaded
from the Internet. But if we want to use these multi-scanner detection systems
effectively for a large scale detection and collection operation, we need the
system to automatically come up with the best decision. Now, the question
remains - how the system can do that? Obviously, it has to use the available
information at hand. Let's look at the available information we can have for the
unknown sample set. Firstly, we have the individual scan results from various
scanners, which can be considered merely as their opinions. We are labeling
them as "opinions" since we don't know for sure whether they are right or
wrong. Secondly, we have the

statistics for each scanner indicating their

accuracy and performance. These statistics are accumulated from previous
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scanning results which can be proven as right or wrong over the course of time.
These statistical accuracy values can be used to measure how right or wrong
these scanners can be. In other words, these are the ratings that indicate how
good these scanners are. Now, the original problem becomes determining how to
combine these detection accuracy ratings and the actual scan results for a given
unknown sample to classify the sample as benign or malicious with the best
possible accuracy. We further investigate this problem in this dissertation.

1.2.3 Detection of HTTP Botnet Command and Control Traffic
A botnet is a network of compromised computers, each of which harbors a piece
of malicious software called bot. The bot software is remotely controlled by a
botmaster, who exploits the botnet for malicious purposes like launching a
distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack, spamming, performing click-fraud
scams, stealing personal user information, etc. At the heart of any botnet is its
communication architecture, i.e. how the botmaster communicates with
hundreds and thousands of bot members. Since the size of a botnet is particularly
crucial for its business, the botnet needs to be formed over common and popular
network infrastructure, especially the Internet. Therefore, the botmaster chooses
legitimate communication channels to interact with the bots. The server that the
botmaster uses for its communication is called Command and Control (C&C)
server. Internet Relay Chat (IRC) used to be the most prevalent communication
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channel among the earliest botnets. Over time, it has been proved that the
botnets formed over IRC network was not stealthy and the entire botnet could be
shut down by simply taking down the IRC server. Moreover, network traffic
monitoring on IRC based botnets was easier and effective in identifying C&C
communication among botnet hosts. Consequently, botnets have evolved to
adopt more common and generalized networking protocols and thus developed
a stealth mechanism. Of the newer protocols used by botnets, peer-to-peer (P2P)
protocols and hypertext transfer protocol (HTTP) are the most notable. The main
advantage of using P2P networks is that it removes the centralized architecture
from the botnet and makes it harder to shut down. However, P2P botnets suffer
from higher latency in C&C communication and increased complexity in
controlling the botnet as a whole. By contrast, HTTP, still being a centralized
client-server protocol, provides the botmasters with desirable trade-off between
stealth and performance. The protocol that runs the World Wide Web (WWW) is
one of the most widely used network protocols, which helps the botmasters in
bypassing most firewalls. In addition, HTTP allows using encryption to avoid
detection based on deep packet inspection.

Security researchers have been working for many years on botnet
detection and mitigation. Over the recent years, we have seen a significant
number of proposals on how to detect different types of botnets. A
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straightforward approach is to apply C&C traffic signatures which can be very
effective for a specific botnet. The problem with this approach is that new botnets
emerge very fast with newer communication patterns, which require new
signatures to detect. To address this issue, most of the network traffic based
methods apply some kind of machine learning algorithm to train and identify
communication patterns and thus adapt to newer threats. However, these
methods still focus on identifying botnet communication itself based on certain
features, rather than isolating legitimate communication from the malicious ones.
It is far easier for the botmasters to avoid certain patterns and come up with new
techniques when they already know what patterns the defenders are looking for.
Consequently, the detection methods begin to suffer from deteriorating
performances against newer botnets. The detection of botnet C&C traffic
becomes much more difficult when it comes to HTTP based C&C, since the
percentage of C&C packets among the overall everyday Web traffic is in
microscopic range. We investigate this problem further in this dissertation.

1.3 Overview of Dissertation
In this dissertation, we address four problems in the area of detection of
malicious contents hidden in the internet. The organization of this dissertation is
as follows.
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In Chapter 2, we provide a background on online advertising and
malicious display ads and propose automated simulation of the user clicks and
automatic downloads to collect and analyze malicious executable files generated
in the process. We implemented an automated system to mimic harmful and
risky browsing activities such as clicking on suspicious online ads, and thereby
to collect malicious executable files for further analysis and diagnosis. Using our
system we crawled over the Internet for a period of 3 months to collect a
significant amount of ad frame or placeholder URLs, which has been monitored
for another period of 3 months to collect more than 13 thousand malicious
executables. The experimental results showed that our system is quite effective in
collecting online malware samples within a short period of time using very
limited resources compared to other honeypot systems.
In Chapter 3, we provide a brief background on game theory and model
the malvertising inspection problem as a game between an attacker (the
malvertiser) and a defender (the ad network). We define the strategies and
payoff functions of each player. We assume both players are aware of each
other's strategies, cost and payoff functions, and the rate of malvertising
detection by the ad network. We then calculate pure strategy and mixed strategy
Nash equilibria for the game. Through the game model, we intend to better
understand the relationship between the malvertiser and the ad network and

9

extract insights that can guide the ad network in its choice of inspection
strategies.

In Chapter 4, we address the problem of finding an optimum
configuration in multi-scanner malware detection systems by first deriving a
mathematical model named Combined Probability Model (CPM) to capture the
combined outcome of a specific combination of scanners, given their individual
detection rates. The mathematical model consists of a set of formulas involving
individual detection probabilities of the scanners. The model gives us a good
approximation of the combined true and false detection probabilities of the
combined system of scanners, which can be used to calculate the overall accuracy
of the multi-scanner system for a specific configuration. Therefore, if we can
calculate the accuracy of all configurations of the system, we can compare them
to determine the optimum configuration that provides us with the maximum
accuracy. We also present two other greedy heuristic based approximation
models called Greedy Approximation Model (GAM) and Complementary
Greedy

Approximation

Model

(CGAM).

These

models

apply

greedy

approximation over CPM formulas to improve runtime and at the same time try
to maintain the accuracy as much as possible. In addition to the original problem,
we also try to answer the following two questions - (1) Is it always beneficial to
increase the number of scanners in a multi-scanner detection system? (2) How
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can we select a subset from all available scanners, which will provide us with a
maximum accuracy for a size of the given subset? To address the second
question, we come up with a ranking system for the scanners which allows us
select a best subset from the full set of scanners. To verify the accuracy of our
models and to answer these additional questions, we first numerically simulate
our models over randomly generated hypothetical datasets and test case
scenarios. From the simulation results, we found that if the average false positive
rate of the scanners is high enough, the accuracy value of multi-scanner system
can decrease at some point with the increase in the number of scanners. At the
end, we provide experimental evaluation based on real-world malware and
goodware datasets and corresponding anti-virus scanning results using a
popular online multi-AV scanning service, VirusTotal. From the evaluations, we
can verify the accuracy of our simulation results and establish that our models
along with the ranking system perform reasonably well in predicting the
optimum configuration to achieve maximum accuracy based on available
information.
In Chapter 5, we introduce an anomaly detection based approach to detect
HTTP-based botnet C&C communication which focuses on how to prevent the
botnet from upgrading itself to avoid detection. That means, we want to make it
very hard for the botmaster to mimic the legitimate HTTP communication and

11

hide C&C activities. Our approach is based on identifying anomaly in client
generated HTTP request packets as well as DNS server generated response
packets for the same HTTP communication. Based on some initial analysis of
both legitimate and botnet C&C HTTP traffic, we have selected some statistical
features that are suitable for detecting anomaly in a large set of captured HTTP
traffic. These features are based on patterns emerging from HTTP request
packets, more specifically, the URL string that is used to fetch data from an
HTTP server. Using these features we primarily run an unsupervised anomaly
detection algorithm to distinguish between HTTP request packets generated by
human actions and HTTP request packets generated by a software bot, both
legitimate and malicious. Then, to further narrow down the isolated packets, we
extract the primary domain names involved in those packets and run a semisupervised anomaly detection algorithm using a selected set of features based on
the DNS server response packets that particularly contain resolved IP address list
(A or AAAA record). Eventually, we are left with a list of domain names that are
highly probable to be involved in malicious C&C communication. Results
indicate that our method can achieve more than 90% detection rate while
maintaining a reasonably low false positive rate.
Finally, we conclude the dissertation with a brief summary of the research
and directions for future work in Chapter 6.
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CHAPTER 2
COLLECTION OF MALWARE DISSEMINATED VIA
MALVERTISING
2.1 Background
2.1.1 Online Advertising
Online advertising is a form of advertising that uses the Internet as the delivery
channel for promotional marketing messages to consumers. It includes all sorts
of online marketing such as email marketing, search engine marketing (SEM) [7],
social media marketing, display advertising, mobile advertising, etc. In this
chapter, our focus is only on display advertising, the type of advertising that is
located on websites in a wide range of different formats and contains items such
as texts, images, flash, video, and audio. Besides the consumer, there are three
major participants in online advertising described as follows. The Ad Publishers
are the owners of the websites or online contents, who integrate or place
advertisements into their contents. The Ad Networks are the companies that
work as the middlemen who connect the Advertisers to interested Ad Publishers
that want to host advertisements. Online Ad Networks usually maintain a
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Figure 2.1 Advertisement delivery system.
central ad server which delivers advertisements to consumers, and also facilitates
ad related activities such as targeting, tracking, reporting and billing. Lastly, the
Advertisers are the business entities or individuals who are interested in
promoting their products through online advertising. Figure 2.1 illustrates a
typical scenario of how the ad delivery system works. From Figure 2.1 we can
see four request-response style communications. The first such interaction is
when the user opens a webpage hosted by the ad publisher who displays the ad
frame or placeholder (referred to as adbox in the figure). This action triggers a
background interaction of the browser with the ad network to fetch the actual
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ads. This is shown as the second pair of request-response communication. The
third interaction happens when the user actually clicks on the ad. The ad
network sends the redirected URL as response which triggers the browser to
request it to generate the final request-response communication. As a result, the
browser gets the ad landing page.

2.1.2 Infection Process of Malicious Ads
The infection process of malicious ads can be largely divided into two categories:
silent infection and user triggered infection. Silent infection can occur when an
Internet user only visits a legitimate website that contains malicious ads. In this
case, the malicious ad itself contains malicious code (written in JavaScript, Action
Script, etc.) which can find Web browser vulnerabilities and exploit them to
infect the user system. This is the most dangerous form of infection, since it does
not require any interaction or trigger from the user. The mere action of visiting a
legitimate and otherwise safe website triggers the infection. On the other hand,
user triggered infections require some form of user interaction such as click or
key press events. By refraining from risky interactions, the user can prevent
infection in most cases. After the first interaction with the malicious ad, the user
usually ends up visiting a malicious ad landing page hosted by the malicious
advertiser. From this page, the user may also be infected in two ways: either
automatically or based on further user interaction. The ultimate outcome can be
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Figure 2.2 Infection paths of malicious advertisements.
one the following three results: user system being infected, a malicious browser
add-on being installed, or a malicious executable file being downloaded. Figure
2.2 depicts various paths and outcomes generated when an ad publisher
webpage is visited. The bold-faced sections of the figure highlight the path we
focus on in this chapter.
Figure 2.3(a) shows a sample malicious ad frame. This is a typical
malicious ad falsely claiming that the user needs to update his or her media
player. If the user clicks on anywhere inside the ad frame (not just the buttons), it
will open a new page where the user will be prompted to download a malicious
binary

executable

file

with

names

like

"mediaplayer.exe"

or

"mediaplayerupdate.exe". Figure 2.3(b) shows the underlying JavaScript code for
the same ad frame. We can clearly see here that the target ad landing page URL
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(a)

(b)

Figure 2.3 (a) Sample malicious ad frame, (b) JavaScript code for the same
malicious ad frame.

cannot be identified straightforwardly. Only after this JavaScript code is
executed in the Web browser, we can see the target URL. This is the primary
reason why we need to simulate user clicks on the ads to find the target URL.

2.2 System Design
Our system can be divided into four major components, including (i) Crawler,
(ii) Detector, (iii) Extractor, and (iv) Verifier, as depicted in Figure 2.4. It also
shows the input and output of each component. Each component implements a
major stage in the overall process of collection and analysis of malicious
executable files. Description of each of the components is given in the following
subsections.
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Figure 2.4 System architecture.

2.2.1 Crawler
The main task of this component is to crawl over the Internet and find ad frames
or placeholders in various websites. To increase the effectiveness in finding
websites with more ads and potential malicious ads, it makes use of the popular
Internet search engines like Google, Bing, Yahoo, etc. A pre-defined list of search
keywords is used to search websites via different search engines and extract a list
of URLs. Then, the web pages of these URLs are fetched and parsed to detect ad
frames or placeholders that display textual or graphical ads. If detected, the ad
frame or placeholder URL is recorded into a list of ad frame URLs for further
processing. Figure 2.5 shows a flowchart of the overall process of the Crawler.
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Figure 2.5 Flowchart of Crawler.

2.2.2 Detector
This component uses the list of ad frame URLs generated by the Crawler and
detects whether the ad eventually results in a malicious download or not. To
achieve this, we need to know what the target URLs are for the ads and test
whether any one of them lead to an executable file download event. A simple
HTML ad will contain the target URL as part of a plain HTML element.
However, with the widespread use of Web 2.0 technologies, most of the ads now
contain complex JavaScript or Action Script code (as shown in Figure 2.3), where
it is very hard to find or generate the target URL. Therefore, we intend to
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simulate user interaction such as mouse click on the ad itself which will trigger
the target ad landing page URL for us. Once we can fetch the ad landing page,
we can further parse and inspect to determine whether it contains any download
URL which lead to a download of an executable binary file. If the Detector
detects at least one such download URL, it records the download URL along
with the ad frame URL. Figure 2.6 shows a flowchart of the overall process of the
Detector.

Figure 2.6 Flowchart of Detector.
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2.2.3 Extractor
We make use of the ad frame URLs that is generated by the Detector to
download more executable files. The design of the Extractor is similar to the
Detector except that it is used to periodically monitor (and download from) only
the already detected ad frame URLs. Using this approach we can maximize the
number of downloaded files from a minimum number of ad frame URLs, since
the contents of the ad placeholder changes dynamically over time with a
probability of generating a new ad every time. Thus, by monitoring a single
malicious ad placeholder we can extract many different malicious files. In
addition, we can investigate the behavior of a single malicious ad frame URL and
find out answers to questions like how frequently ads change, how many distinct
download URLs are generated from the same ad frame, etc. Examples of such
analysis results are further discussed in section 2.4.

2.2.4

Verifier

This is the part where we automatically submit the collected executable files to
anti-malware scanning engines to verify the maliciousness of them. Instead of
using a single scanner, we used the online service provided by VirusTotal [8]
where at most 56 anti-virus scanning engines are used to generate the scanning
report.
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2.3 System Implementation
We have implemented our system using Python 3.4. Details of the
implementation for each component are given in the following sub-sections.

2.3.1 Crawler
We used a list of search keywords generated from Table 2.1. Each keyword is
generated by combining one or more qualifier keywords and one content
keyword. To create this list of potential keywords, we tried to answer the
following question: what types of websites are most likely to host high number
of advertisements? To find the answer, we manually analyzed 20 ad-filled
websites collected from various Internet discussion forums. We found that most
of the websites offer free services or contain free contents, for which they try to
compensate by placing as many ads as possible.
Table 2.1 Search Keywords

Qualifier Keywords
Free
Download
Watch
Stream
Hack

Content Keywords
Movies
News
Ebook
Sports
Pdf
Highlights
Music
Software
Mp3
Freeware
Wallpaper
Cracks
Fonts
Password
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Therefore, a good qualifier keyword is "free". Similarly, we found that one
of the most desired services is downloading some content or data from the
Internet. Hence, "download" should be a good qualifier keyword.
The fetching and parsing of websites has been done using Python libraries
"Requests" [9] and "lxml" [10] respectively. The detection of ad frames or
placeholders has been done using the Python library "adblockparser" [11] and a
list of filters from EasyList [12], an ad filter provider service designed for the
most popular ad blocking Web browser extension Adblock Plus [13].

2.3.2 Detector
To implement the Detector, we needed some way to simulate the user click
events on the ads. Selenium WebDriver API [14] provided us with such features.
This Python API can be easily used to simulate the behaviors exactly like what a
normal human Web user will do, such as opening a URL in the browser, clicking
on an ad, switching to new pages as a result of the clicking, responding to any
JavaScript alert generated in the process, etc. A difficult task was to determine
where to click, since ads are dynamically generated with varying sizes.
Fortunately, Selenium provides a way to click on a specific HTML element.
Therefore, we iterated over all the HTML elements of the ad and generated click
event for them. The assumption we make is that at least one of the elements
should be clickable and should produce our desired ad landing page as a result
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of the click event. This is a valid assumption since usually the ads are generated
such that the entire ad frame is clickable and the user can click anywhere inside
the frame to produce the ad landing page.
After the ad landing page is opened, we parse the HTML source and find
all target URLs leading to external resources. Here, the Selenium WebDriver
executes most of the internal JavaScript code and we can use the innerHTML
property (the property that sets or returns the HTML content of an element) for
each element to get the generated HTML code from JavaScript code. In this way,
we can make sure that we don't miss any target URL generated by internal
JavaScript codes.

2.3.3

Extractor

The implementation of the Extractor is similar to Detector. The only difference
lies in the input and output. The input for the Extractor only contains those ad
frame URLs that have been detected already, and the output contains
downloaded executable files with corresponding download URLs for a specific
ad frame URL. We map the downloaded files and URLs to a specific ad frame
URL for further analysis later.
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2.3.4 Verifier
The VirusTotal API [15] provided by VirusTotal is used to implement the
Verifier. For each of the downloaded files, we generated a scanning report from
VirusTotal which contains how many anti-virus scanners have detected the file
as malicious and what classes of malware the file belongs to.

2.4

Results and Analysis

We tested our system for a total period of 6 months and divided it into two
stages of 3 months each. In the first stage, we deployed the Crawler and the
Detector for 3 months. The Crawler used the search keywords generated from
Table 2.1 and crawled 51,467 websites, where 10,950 of them contained at least
one advertisement. The number of detected ad frame URLs were 73,240, which
were passed to the Detector. We detected ad frames containing at least one target
URL which lead to the download of executable binary files. In total, we found
895 such ad frame URLs. This is our input to the second stage of experiment.
In the second stage, we ran the Extractor for 3 months to monitor and
extract downloads from 895 suspicious ad frame URLs. It ran a single iteration
over all 895 of them 3 times a day. We recorded the download URLs along with
the downloaded files for each individual ad frame URL. In total, we found 13,648
distinct executable binary files downloaded in the process. These files were fed to
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the Verifier to identify false positives checking against 56 anti-virus scanners
provided by VirusTotal. Only 115 files out of 13,648 pass all the anti-virus
scanners as benign and 13,353 files were identified by at least one scanner as
malicious. This means that 99% of the files collected by our system were
identified as malicious by VirusTotal. Table 2.2 lists the number of different types
of malware detected. A single malware sample can belong to two or more
different categories, since modern malware is packaged with multiple features
and functionalities. Here, we have considered all the labels for a single sample
labeled by different scanners. From the VirusTotal reports, we found that on an
average each sample was detected as malicious by at least 9 out of 56 scanners.
Table 2.2 Types of Malware Detected
Malware Type
Adware
Trojan
Virus
Backdoors
Potentially Unwanted Program

Total Number
12,952
10,816
4,406
3,872
12,151

Percentage
97%
81%
33%
29%
91%

Some interesting results were observed when we grouped the malware
samples and their download URLs by corresponding ad frame URL. We
observed that every time we extracted the download target, a new distinct URL
can be found. Even though the downloaded binary files looked exactly same
with respect to name and size, the files were found to be different when MD5
hash was calculated. We found that during the 3 month period, we could extract
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approximately 49 malware samples on an average from a single ad frame URL,
with a maximum of 255 samples. After the 3 month period ended, we replayed
all download URLs to check their validity. 21% of them were still working while
the rest of them were redirecting to a different webpage. In addition, malware
samples collected from a single ad source usually fell into the same malware
family or class. From these observations, we conclude that (1) a single malicious
ad frame URL can be monitored for a long period of time to consistently collect
malware samples, (2) URL that hosts the malware is changed frequently to
provide a constant availability of malware as well as to thwart takedown efforts,
(3) even though the malware samples disseminated by a single ad source belong
to the same class or family, they could be distinct in binary content, which means
every now and then a new malware payload is generated with a relatively short
lifetime.
Additionally, we tested the captured download URLs via VirusTotal URL
scanner service. We found that only 34% of the URLs were flagged as malicious
by at least one URL scanner. Therefore, the list of malicious download URLs
generated from our system can be a good addition to online URL blacklist
services.
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2.5

Related Work

In the scientific literature, malicious online advertising is better known as
"malvertising" by taking the portmanteau of the words "malicious" and
"advertising". Although numerous news articles have been published on
malvertising, not many research articles can be found on this topic.
Sood et al. [16] provided one of the earliest accounts of how malvertising
works. They explained several malvertising modes and offered a few guidelines
to prevent them. S. Manfield-Devine presented the recent state of malvertising in
[17], describing the use of Flash and mobile websites. Zhang et al. [18] proposed
a detection scheme to detect malvertising cases using depth of the URL
strategies. In addition, Google has opened a website [19] dedicated to prevent
malvertising compromises in all of Google's and partners' ad properties in an
effort to build community awareness against it.
There has been a considerable amount of research done regarding Webbased malware collection. In the year 2006, researchers from Microsoft [20] came
up with an automated Web patrolling system to automatically identify and
monitor malicious websites that install malware programs by exploiting browser
vulnerabilities. Since then, we have seen many other research efforts to automate
malware collection from the Web. Worth mentioning among these are
HoneyBow [21], PhoneyC [22], Rozzle [23], WebPatrol [24], HoneyInspector [25],
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and PMCCS [26]. HoneyBow toolkit is an automated malware collection system
based on high-interaction honeypots, which are able to collect autonomous
spreading malware in an automated manner. PhoneyC is a virtual honeyclient
that mimics the behavior of the user-driven network client applications such as
Web browsers and is exploited by an attacker's content to reveal the attack in the
process. Rozzle is a JavaScript multi-execution environment that can reveal
environment specific Internet malware. WebPatrol automatically collects Webbased malware scenarios including complete Web infection trails to enable
further detailed analysis. HoneyInspector is another active honeypot system that
collects malware from malicious websites as well as from shared P2P files.
Proactive Malware Collection and Classification System (PMCCS) uses P2P
software to actively search suspicious malware samples such as software crack
tools. Although each of these research works presents a way to collect Web-based
malware samples, none of these have explored malvertising and considered it as
a source of malware collection and analysis.

2.6

Summary

Our main contribution in this work is, we have designed and implemented an
automated system to collect malware samples from online advertising sources.
To the best of our knowledge, this is one of the first efforts to automate
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information collection for malvertising research, which can reveal many new
paths of investigation and analysis in this area. Moreover, the collected samples
are instances of live and active malware that are infecting Internet users at this
very moment, which are extremely useful for research purposes.
As of now our system can only collect information related to
downloadable executable binary files via malvertising sources. If we refer back to
Figure 2.2, we can see that we have only implemented one path in the malicious
ad infection process. There are still two more paths yet to be explored. One is
where the system is infected in the background, that is, a malicious code is
executed in the browser through browser vulnerabilities and plug-in exploits.
The other one is where a malicious add-on is installed into the browser. We can
further extend our work to incorporate both of these infection paths.
Along with the malicious executable files, we can collect the HTML,
JavaScript and Action Script sources of the malicious ads and further investigate
to find patterns so that they can be used in the future to detect malicious ads
before they are executed. Moreover, the defenders can use the information about
these patterns to develop mitigation strategies. This can be a very important
future extension of our work.
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CHAPTER 3

A GAME THEORETIC MODEL OF MALVERTISING
3.1 Background
3.1.1 Overview of Game Theory
Game theory identifies multi-person decision scenarios as games where each
player selects actions which result in the best possible self rewards, while
anticipating and considering the rational actions from other players. A player is
the basic entity of a game who makes choices of what actions to perform. A game
is a formal description of the strategic interaction that includes the constraints of,
and payoffs for, a set of actions that the players can choose from, without
specifying what actions they actually take. A solution concept is a formal
description of how the game will be played by applying the best possible
strategies and what the results might be. A strategy for a player is a complete set
of actions in all possible scenarios throughout the game. If the strategy specifies
to take a unique action in a scenario then it is called a pure strategy. If the
strategy specifies a probability distribution for all possible actions in a scenario
then the strategy is referred to as a mixed strategy.
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Nash equilibrium is a solution concept that describes an equilibrium state
of the game where no player would prefer to change his strategy as that would
lower his payoffs given that all the other players are adhering to their respective
strategies. This solution concept only specifies the equilibrium state but does not
specify how that state is reached in the game. The Nash equilibrium is the most
famous equilibrium and one of the most used solution concepts in game theory.

3.1.2 Game Theory Definitions

Game
A game is a formal description of the strategic interaction between opposing or
co-operating entities where constraints and payoff for actions are taken into
consideration.

Player
A player is a basic entity in a game that is required to make choices for actions.

Action
An action is a player's move in the given game.

Payoff
The payoff is the positive or negative reward to a player associated with a given
action.
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Strategy
A strategy is a set of actions that a given player can choose during game play.
3.1.3 The Malvertising Game
The major motivation behind malvertising is the potential lucrative profit. Many
malvertising campaigns install on vulnerable machines a variety of ransomware,
which encrypts user data and files and forces users to pay a ransom of several
hundred dollars to obtain the decryption key. According to the 2016 Annual
Security Report published by Cisco [27], the estimated yearly income from
ransomware per successful malvertising campaign could reach as high as $34M.
However, this potentially huge profit does not come for free; there is a cost
associated with launching a campaign. Most malvertisements operate with the
help of a tool called exploit kit [4], which can probe the vulnerabilities on the
victim machine's web browser or plug-in in order to exploit and install the
malware. Malvertisers need to either develop the exploit kit from scratch (need a
lot of investment), hire someone to do it (there is a list of task prices in the Deep
Web black market [28]), purchase it (about $20-30K [28]), or rent it (about
$500/month [28]). There is an expensive price tag attached to any option.
Moreover, in order to protect their "investments" on malicious ads and malware
from detection by the ad network, malvertisers often apply to their campaigns a
variety of evasion techniques such as fingerprinting the execution environment,
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redirecting to compromised IP addresses, and malware polymorphism
(introduced in more detail in the next section). These evasion techniques also
incur considerable overhead cost on the malvertiser.

On the other hand, in order to control and limit the huge reputation
damage and financial losses caused by malvertising campaigns [5], the ad
network also spends a lot of money and efforts to apply inspection techniques on
submitted ads, including live monitoring and code analysis. Similar to the case of
launching malvertising campaigns, these inspection efforts also incur substantial
overhead coming from labor, infrastructure, intellectual property fee for
licensing diagnosis tools (sometimes including purchasing exploit kits for
analysis purpose), time needed to conduct analysis (ranging from a few minutes
to tens of hours, on average around 10 hours per case), and cost for establishing
partnership with other companies for sharing of expertise and data [6].

However, we note that both the malvertiser and the ad network are under
the constraints of resource and time, which makes it impossible and impractical
for the malvertiser to always submit malicious ads and for the ad network to
inspect every submitted ad. Therefore, the malvertising inspection problem can
be modeled as a game between an attacker (the malvertiser) and a defender (the
ad network).
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3.1.4 Attacker and Defender Strategies in Malvertising Game
Malicious advertisers employ many strategies to evade detection including
fingerprinting, redirection, just-in-time assembling and compilation, obfuscation,
timing based evasion, etc. Researchers at Malwarebytes and GeoEdge [29]
investigated malvertising campaigns for several months and found out about an
effective evasion technique used by the threat actors called fingerprinting. This
technique is actually not new, rather has been used by the exploit kits for some
times now. Now it is being used earlier rather than late in the malvertising chain,
helping the malicious advertisers to decide whether to display a malicious ad or
a benign ad. Basically, the fingerprinting technique employs sophisticated
obfuscated code inside the ad to detect indications that can identify a machine
belonging to a security researcher or a honeypot. Researchers at Invincia [30]
identified a new technique called "just-in-time" (JIT) or on-host assembly of
malware. This novel approach can evade detection from network sandbox and
traditional endpoint security solutions while compromising vulnerable systems.
JIT malware uses late-binding techniques to assemble a malware executable on
the target endpoint itself in order to evade network sandbox analysis. In
addition, native Windows components from the target machine are used to
assemble the payload. This helps in evading endpoint white-listing approaches
that allow only approved programs to run. The most recently discovered
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AdGholas [31] malvertising campaign have been found to have used
steganography and file whitelisting approach to evade detection.

Most of the malvertising campaigns involve an exploit kit to carry out the
infection or delivery of malicious payload. Prominent examples of exploit kits [4]
include SweetOrange, Angler, Magnitude, Rig, Nuclear, etc. Exploit kits are also
equipped with evasion techniques [4] such as fingerprinting, obfuscation, etc.
Researchers have found that through a vulnerability in Internet Explorer, an
attacker can check the presence of files or folders in an affected system, thereby
detecting whether the system is a virtual machine or has an antivirus software
installed. For obfuscation purposes, the use of Pack200 archive format has been
seen in use by Angler exploit kit. Other evasion techniques include encrypted
payload, IP and domain fluxing, domain shadowing, and file-less infections [32].

There has been some work done by both industry and academic
researchers on the strategies that can be employed by the defender, i.e. the ad
network or the ad publisher. GeoEdge [6] is a commercial provider for ad
verification and protection services. Their services include automated ad
verification solution that monitors live advertisements using a globally
distributed network of monitors. Similar techniques involving crawling and
monitoring have been found in some prior academic research works as well [33,
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34, 35, 36]. Another focus of research was to detect malicious exploit kits. Taylor
et al. [37] proposed a network-centric technique to detect malicious exploit kits
by capturing tree-like web request structures and finding similarities among
them. Their approach is based on the insight that to infect a client browser, a
web-based exploit kit must guide the client browser to visit its landing page
through multiple redirections generating a pattern of multiple web requests. This
pattern can be identified as a tree-like structure and used for the purpose of
detection of malicious exploit kits. Stock et al. [38] presented Kizzle, an antivirus
signature generator for detecting exploit kits. Wang et al. [39] presented an
approach for identifying new undetected landing pages that lead to drive-by
downloads by using malicious content patterns identified in previously known
collection of Malware Distribution Networks. Malicious obfuscated JavaScript
code has been an integrated part of malvertising campaigns. Lu and Dubray [40]
presented an approach for automatic de-obfuscation of JavaScript code using
dynamic analysis and slicing that preserves code semantics. The resulting code
becomes observationally equivalent to the original program with obfuscation
removed which exposes the core logic of the computation it performs. Xu et al.
[41] presented JStill, a mostly static approach to malicious obfuscated JavaScript
detection that uses static analysis of function invocation and lightweight runtime
inspections. Dong et al. [42] proposed AdSentry, a sandbox for JavaScript-based
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advertisements that enables flexible controlling on ad script behaviors by
completely mediating its access to the web page (including its DOM) without
restricting the JavaScript functionality exposed to the ads. Dewald et al. [43]
presented ADSandbox, an analytical sandbox system for malicious websites that
executes any embedded JavaScript within an isolated environment and log every
critical action. Analyzing these logs using heuristic rules, ADSandbox can decide
whether the site is malicious or not. Another useful evasion technique employed
by the attackers is URL redirection. Mekky et al. [44] presented a method to
identify malicious chains of HTTP redirections using supervised decision tree
classifiers.

3.2 The Malvertising Game Model
Our solution aims to apply game theory to formulate the problem of inspecting
the malware inserted by the malvertisers into the Web-based advertising system.
We define a normal form game of two players, the Attacker and the Defender.
The Attacker represents the malvertiser, whose goal is to distribute as many
copies of its malware to vulnerable machines as possible when unwitting users
visit legitimate websites (i.e. ad publishers). The Defender represents the ad
network, whose goal is to detect and remove malicious online ads before they are
posted on the ad publishers' websites. We assume that both players are rational;
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that is, they both aim to maximize their payoffs, and will choose the strategy
which is the best response to the strategy chosen by the other player. The
Attacker has two strategies, namely "to post a benign ad" (denoted as B) and "to
post a malicious ad for distributing malware" (denoted as M). The Defender also
has two strategies, namely "to inspect the submitted ad" (denoted as I) and "not
to inspect the submitted ad" (denoted as No-I).

Next, we define the payoff functions for each possible combination of the
two players' chosen strategies. The notations used in the payoff functions are
defined as follows:


cm: Attacker's cost of launching malvertising.



ci: Defender's cost of inspecting online ads.



g:

Attacker's

gain

of

successful

malware

distribution

through

malvertising. We can assume that g > cm holds because otherwise the
Attacker will not have sufficient motivation to post malicious ads.


l: Defender's loss due to undetected malvertising. We can assume that l > ci
holds because otherwise the Defender will not have sufficient motivation
to inspect submitted ads.



α: probability of Defender detecting malvertising, where 0 ≤ α ≤ 1.
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Figure 3.1 shows the matrix of the payoff functions under each possible
combination of the two players' chosen strategies. In each square, the first value
represents the Attacker's payoff, while the second value represents the
Defender's payoff. Several payoff functions are straightforward, so we will only
explain the payoff functions in the bottom left square. When the Attacker plays
strategy M and the Defender plays strategy I, the Attacker incurs cost cm for
launching malvertising but can get the gain g of successful malware distribution
with probability 1-α; the Defender incurs inspection cost ci but can reduce the
loss due to undetected malvertising by αl.

Figure 3.1 Payoff functions of the game.

40

3.3 Finding Nash Equilibrium of the Game
In this section, we discuss the Nash equilibria computed from the game theoretic
model. We explain how to find the pure-strategy and mixed-strategy Nash
equilibria respectively.

3.3.1 Pure-Strategy Nash Equilibria
According to the payoff functions of each possible combination of strategy
chosen by the Attacker and Defender as defined in Figure 3.1, we can compute
the Nash equilibria of this game. To this end, we need to first determine the best
response of each player toward each strategy chosen by the other player.

For the Attacker, we need to determine his best response to each of the
Defender's two possible strategies, namely I and No-I, respectively. When the
Defender plays I, we compare the Attacker's payoff for playing B, which is 0, and
playing M, which is -cm+(1-α)g. If -cm+(1-α)g ≤ 0, which is equivalent to α ≥

,

then B is Attacker's best response to Defender's strategy I. If -cm+(1-α)g ≥ 0, which
is α ≤
when α =

, then M is Attacker's best response to Defender's strategy I. Note that
, both B and M can be Attacker's best response to Defender's

strategy I according to the definition of best response. When the Defender plays
No-I, we compare the Attacker's payoff for playing B, which is 0, and playing M,
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which is -cm+g. We can get -cm+g > 0 since g > cm. Thus, M is Attacker's dominant
strategy to Defender's strategy No-I.

For the Defender, we need to determine his best response to each of the
Attacker's two possible strategies, namely B and M, respectively. When the
Attacker plays B, we compare Defender's payoff for playing I, which is -ci, and
playing No-I, which is 0. Since cost ci must be positive, hence -ci < 0, we can get
that No-I is Defender's dominant strategy to Attacker's strategy B. When the
Attacker plays M, we compare the Defender's payoff for playing I, which is -ci-(1α)l, and playing No-I, which is -l. If -ci-(1-α)l-(-l) = -ci+αl ≥ 0, which is equivalent
to α ≥ , then I is Defender's best response to Attacker's strategy M. If -ci+αl  0,
which is α  , then No-I is Defender's best response to Attacker's strategy M.
Note that when α =

, both I and No-I can be Defender's best response to

Attacker's strategy M according to the definition of best response.

From the best responses of both players discussed above we can
determine the Nash equilibria of this game. If

 α 

, then the strategy

profile (M, I) is a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, because when this condition
holds, strategy M is Attacker's best response to the Defender's strategy I, and
strategy I is also the Defender's best response to the Attacker's strategy M. In the
same way, we can derive that if α  , then strategy profile (M, No-I) is a pure-
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strategy Nash equilibrium. However, if α >

and α >

, then no pure-strategy

Nash equilibrium exists. This is because when one player chooses the best
response strategy corresponding to the other player's chosen strategy, the latter
player will shift to another strategy for it is the best response to the former
player's chosen strategy, and then the former player will also shift to another
strategy, which forms a loop as demonstrated in the example of the well-known
Rock-Paper-Scissors game. However, a mixed-strategy may exist when α >
α >

and

, in which the Attacker and the Defender randomize their strategies

instead of sticking to the same strategy at all times.
3.3.2 Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibrium
Next, we show how to derive the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium of this game.
As shown in Figure 3.2, we assume that the Attacker plays strategy B with
probability x and plays strategy M with probability 1-x, and assume that the
Defender plays strategy I with probability y and plays strategy No-I with
probability 1-y.

To compute x, consider that the Attacker will randomize his choice of
strategy to make Defender indifferent between I and No-I; that is, the expected
payoff is the same for the Defender no matter he plays I or No-I. From Figure
3.2, we get
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x(-ci)+(1-x)(-ci-(1-α)l) = 0x-(1-x)l

x=

(3.1)

Figure 3.2 Attacker and Defender randomize their choice of strategies.

On the other hand, y can be computed with the consideration that the
Defender will randomize his choice of strategy to make Attacker indifferent
between B and M; that is, the expected payoff is the same for the Attacker no
matter he plays B or M. From Figure 3.2, we get

y(-cm+(1-α)g)+(1-y)(-cm+g) = 0y-(1-y)0 = 0

y=

(3.2)
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Therefore, we can derive that if α >

and α >

, then the strategy

profile {xB + (1-x)M, yI + (1-y)No-I} is a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium, where
probabilities x and y are as computed above.

3.4 Evaluation and Analysis
In this section, we discuss the evaluation and analysis of our game theoretic
model. We developed a Python program to evaluate our model numerically. The
variables needed in the numerical formula for pure and mixed strategy
equilibrium are α, ci, cm, l and g. We have done the numerical simulations for the
Defender's payoff and Attacker's payoff when one of these variables is varied
with all the other variables assigned a fixed value. Note that the values used in
the simulations are just for the purpose of providing examples and generating
charts so that the effects of one variable on another variable can be observed.
3.4.1 Simulations
We give a brief overview of the purpose and results of each simulation as
follows. In the first simulation, we aim to observe the effects of detection rate α
on the Defender's payoff. We vary α from 0.0 to 1.0 with a step size of 0.05 and all
the other parameters remain fixed to calculate the Defender's payoff. The values
of the other parameters are chosen as follows: ci = 0.4, cm= 0.3, g = 0.9, and l is
assigned three different values 0.6, 0.7, and 0.8 in order to obtain three curves
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based on l. Figure 3.3 shows that the Defender's payoff remains constant at -l
when α ≤ 0.57 or

, which corresponds to the first case of pure-strategy Nash

equilibrium. When α > 0.57 and α ≤ 0.66 or

, the Defender's payoff steadily

increases. We see a switch from pure strategy to mixed strategy when α > 0.66.
From this figure, we see that when the detection rate α is low, it has no effect on
the Defender's payoff until α exceeds the first threshold (
Defender's

payoff

increases

as

α

After that, the
continues

to

increase.

Figure 3.3 Variation in Defender's payoff with α.

In the second simulation, we aim to observe the effects of detection rate α
on the Attacker's payoff. We vary α from 0.0 to 1.0 with a step size of 0.05 and all
the other parameters remain fixed to calculate the Attacker's payoff. The values
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of the other parameters are chosen as follows: ci = 0.4, cm= 0.3, l = 0.7, and g is
assigned three different values 0.7, 0.8, and 0.9 in order to obtain three curves
based on g. Figure 3.4 shows that the Attacker's payoff remains constant at g - cm
when α ≤ 0.57 or , which is the first case of pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
When α > 0.57 and α ≤ 0.66 or

, the Attacker's payoff sharply comes down to

0.078 and then steadily decreases until it reaches zero. It remains constantly at
zero when α > 0.66. From this figure, we see that when the detection rate α is low,
it has no effect on the Attacker's payoff until α reaches the first threshold (
Then, there is a sharp drop in the Attacker's payoff. As α continues to increase,
Attacker's payoff continues to decrease until it reaches zero.

Figure 3.4 Variation in Attacker's payoff with α.
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In the third simulation, we aim to observe the effects of the Defender's
cost ci on the Defender's payoff. We vary Defender's cost ci and all the other
parameters remain fixed to calculate Defender's payoff. We vary ci from 0.0 to
0.65 with a step size of 0.05 (ci stops at 0.65 since according to the assumption in
Section 3.2, ci must be less than l, which is assigned as 0.7 here). The values for
the other parameters were as follows: cm = 0.3, l = 0.7 and g = 0.9. The value of α is
assigned 0.3, 0.5, 0.7 to obtain three different curves. We can see in Figure 3.5 that
for all three curves, when α > , defender's payoff steadily decreases and reaches
the constant value of -l. It remains at this value when α ≤ .

Figure 3.5 Variation in Defender's payoff with ci.

Figure 3.6 shows the results for the simulation of Attacker's payoff vs.
Attacker's cost cm. The fixed parameters ci, l, and g have the same values as in
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previous simulations, with only cm being varied from 0.0 to 0.85. The value of α is
assigned 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7 to obtain five different curves. We see that as the
Attacker's cost cm increases, the payoff linearly decreases until it reaches 0. The
starting point of each payoff curve (i.e. when cm = 0) depends on the value of the
detection rate α. The higher the value of α, the lower the starting value of the
payoff.

Figure 3.6 Variation in Attacker's payoff with cm.

Figure 3.7 shows the results for the simulation of Defender's payoff vs.
Defender's loss l. The fixed parameters cm, ci, and g have the same values as in
previous simulations, with only l being varied from 0.45 to 1.25 (l starts from 0.45

49

since according to the assumption in Section 3.2, l should always be greater than
ci, which is assigned as 0.4). The value of α is assigned 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7 to
obtain five curves. We see that as the Defender's loss l increases, the payoff
linearly decreases. According to the Nash equilibria we derived, there is a switch
of strategies for the Defender from No-I to I in the middle depending on the
value of α. After the point of switch, the rate of decrease in the Defender's payoff
slows down. The higher the value of α, the higher the change in the rate of
decrease in the payoff. We see that when α = 0.7, the payoff becomes almost
constant after the switch of strategies.

Figure 3.7 Variation in Defender's payoff with l.
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Figure 3.8 shows the results for the simulation of Attacker's payoff vs.
Attacker's gain g. The fixed parameters cm, ci, and l have the same values as in
previous simulations, with only g being varied from 0.35 to 1.25. The value of α is
assigned 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7 to obtain five curves. We see that as g increases, the
attacker's payoff always increases at a constant rate when α is lower (0.3, 0.4, or
0.5). However, for a higher α (0.6 or 0.7), the payoff remains zero when g is not
high enough, and starts to rise only when g is higher than a threshold.

Figure 3.8 Variation in Attacker's payoff with g.
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3.4.2 Analysis of the Game Theoretic Model
From the analysis of the payoff functions of the Attacker and Defender, the
conditions of each Nash equilibrium, and the results of above simulations, we
can derive the following insights:

1. This game is not a zero-sum game, because the Attacker's gain does not
come from the Defender's loss.

2. Although performing inspection (playing strategy I) will not bring the
Defender any positive gain, it will lower his loss if he can detect the
malicious ads with a sufficiently high rate. Therefore, the Defender is still
motivated to inspect the submitted ads before letting them pass and be
posted on ad publisher's website.
3. If the detection rate is too low (α  ), then the Defender will just choose
not to inspect the ads. This is because in this case the reduction of
Defender's loss due to inspection is less than the cost spent on inspection,
and thus will not lower the overall cost.

4. If the detection rate is not high enough (α <

), then the Attacker will

always post malicious ads. This is because that although some malicious
ads submitted by the Attacker will be detected by the Defender's
inspection techniques, the gain brought in by those malicious ads
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successfully delivered to vulnerable user machines is still higher than the
cost of launching malvertising.

5. If the detection rate is high enough (α >

and α > ), then the Attacker

and Defender start to randomize their choice of strategy because no purestrategy Nash equilibrium exists.

6. Assume that the detection rate (α) is within the same range as given in
point 5 (i.e. α >

and α > ). Provided that everything else is constant,

higher α will make the Attacker incline more to post benign ads (from
Equation (3.1) in Section 3.3.2, we can get that x increases when α
increases), and make the Defender incline more to not inspect the ads
(from Equation (3.2) in Section 3.3.2, we can get that y decreases when α
increases).

7. Assume that the detection rate (α) is within the same range as given in
point 5, and the Defender has knowledge of the Attacker's average gain
(g) resulting from each successful delivery of malicious ad. Provided that
everything else is constant, higher g will make Defender incline more to
inspect (from Equation (3.2) in Section 3.3.2, we can get that y increases
when g increases).
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8. Assume that the detection rate (α) is within the same range as given in
point 5, and the Attacker has knowledge of the Defender's average loss (l)
resulting from each undetected malicious ad. Provided that everything
else is constant, higher l will make Attacker incline more to post benign
ads (from Equation (3.1) in Section 3.3.2, we can get that x increases when l
increases).

3.5 Related Work
Researchers

have

proposed

complete

defense

systems

to

counter

malvertisements as well. Ford et al. [45] developed a tool that can automatically
analyze Flash advertisements to identify malicious behavior. Li et al. [46]
presented MadTracer, a malvertising detection system based on machine
learning techniques that learn and identify prominent features from malicious
advertising nodes and their related content delivery paths. MadTracer can
automatically generate detection rules and utilize them to detect malvertising
activities. Rastogi et al. [47] developed a framework for analyzing the app-web
interfaces in Android applications and successfully analyzed 201 ad networks
and their associated ad library packages and 600,000 apps in the Google Play
store and identified hundreds of malicious files and scam campaigns. Their
scheme involves triggering of the app-web interfaces, detection of malicious
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content, and provenance to identify the responsible parties. Arshad et al. [48]
proposed an in-browser approach called Excision to automatically detect and
block malicious third-party content inclusions as the user's browser loads web
pages or executes browser extensions. They claimed that their approach does not
rely on the inspection of the resources' content; rather, it relies on analyzing the
sequence of inclusions that leads to the resolution and loading of a final thirdparty resource.

Researchers have previously applied the game theoretic approach to
combat other similar malicious threats. Njilla et al. [49] proposed a game
theoretic framework to model the security and trust relationship in cyberspace
among users, service providers and attackers. The authors formulated a threeplayer game and analyzed different solutions obtained from Nash equilibrium
that can benefit the service providers in decision making. Kamhoua et al. [50]
proposed a game-theoretic approach for testing for hardware Trojans in digital
circuits where the testing is modeled as a zero-sum game between malicious
manufacturers or designers who want to insert Trojans, and testers whose goal is
to detect the Trojans. The resulting solution involves multiple possible mixed
strategy Nash equilibria that can provide guideline for optimum test sets for
identifying and preventing hardware Trojans. Similar game theoretic approaches
have been used in [51, 52, 53, 54].
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3.6 Summary
Malvertising has posed serious security threats to the Internet, and caused losses
to Internet users and ad networks alike. In this work, we formulated the
malvertising inspection problem with a game theoretic model, and introduced a
normal form game between the malvertiser and the ad network. To the best of
our knowledge, this is the first attempt to apply game theory to model this
problem. We computed pure-strategy and mixed-strategy Nash equilibria for the
two players, and derived several useful insights from analysis of the game. Our
findings can provide guidelines for ad networks to best utilize their resources to
mitigate the problem of malvertising.

In the future, we aim to extend our game theoretic model to consider the
repeated Bayesian game between the malvertiser and the ad network. The main
characteristic of a Bayesian game is that one or both of the players have
incomplete information about the type of the other player, which will allow us to
model the scenario when the ad network has incomplete information to
determine whether the advertiser belongs to the benign type or the malicious
type. Moreover, repeated game will allow the players to incorporate the
information they learned in previous games into the playing of future games.
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CHAPTER 4

MAXIMIZING ACCURACY IN MULTI-SCANNER MALWARE
DETECTION SYSTEMS
4.1 Problem Formulation
In this section, we have formulated the problem of maximizing accuracy in a
multi-scanner detection system using appropriate formal notations. Table 4.1
lists some of these notations used in the formulation. Formally, the problem of
maximizing accuracy in a multi-scanner detection system can be stated as
follows:
Given N scanners along with their respective (true positive and false
positive) detection rates or probabilities Pi (where 1 ≤ i ≤ N) and binary detection
results (either true or false) for a given sample obtained from these N scanners.,
how can we find the optimum value of T (1 ≤ T ≤ N) where T is the threshold to
decide maliciousness of that given sample. Here, we assume the N is a finite
number and we only have the detection rates or probabilities associated with
each scanner that can be calculated from past detection history of the scanners.
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Table 4.1 Notations

Symbol
I
Oi
N
Q
T
Pi
PTi
PFi
CP(t)

Description
Input to the multi-scanner system
Output of ith scanner (0 or 1)
Total number of scanners
Optimum number of scanners to achieve maximum
accuracy
Threshold to decide the maliciousness of an object
Detection probability of ith scanner
The probability of classifying a malicious object as
malicious by ith scanner
The probability of classifying a benign object as malicious
by ith scanner
Combined detection probability when T = t

The problem can be extended further to answer the following questions:
1) Assuming that N is the total number of scanners that we can use and Q is the
optimum number of scanners to achieve maximum accuracy, what is the
relationship between N and Q? Is N = Q always holds, or Q < N can also be true?
In other words, does adding another scanner always improve accuracy?

2) If M is the size of a subset of all N scanners, how do we select these M scanners
to achieve maximum accuracy that is possible for any subset of scanners of size
M. In other words, given that there can be

of combinations possible, how can

we rank all the scanners to select the best M scanners such that it will provide
maximum accuracy among all these combinations possible?
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4.2 Combined Probability Model (CPM)
In this section, we will explain the development of the Combined Probability Model
(CPM) in detail. As mentioned earlier, we have devised a set of formula to
construct the model. In the formulas, we used certain symbols and notations to
denote various terms. Table 4.1 lists these notations. To help better understand
the model, we will start with a small scaled model consisting only 3 scanners.
Then, we will extend the small scaled model to a more generalized version.

4.2.1 3-Scanner CPM
We start with a simple 3-scanner model (N=3) to better illustrate and explain the
method of developing the generalized model. The most generic multi-scanner
system consisting 3 scanners should be a parallel system of scanners, depicted as
in Figure 4.1. A parallel system of scanners is a system of scanners where each
input sample is fed to all the scanners in parallel and at the same time. We

Figure 4.1 A 3-scanner parallel system.
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assume here that all the scanners are binary scanners, i.e. they produce an output
of either 1 or 0, where a 1-output means the sample is detected as malicious and
0-output means the sample is detected as benign.
To decide maliciousness of an input object, we have 3 choices here. We
can label the object as malicious if (i) all three scanners label it as malicious, (ii)
any two of them label it as malicious, or (iii) any one of them labels it as
malicious. This is equivalent to considering the value of T as 3, 2 and 1
respectively.
Now, there are two distinct probabilities associated with each scanner – PT
and PF. PT is used to calculate the overall true positive probability and PF is used
to calculate the overall false positive probability. For the sake of generality, we
will only use the notation P to denote a particular probability here.
To understand how we can come up with the equations, we have to break
down each case into smaller parts. For example, if we consider T = 1, this means
that if any single scanner detects the sample, we can consider that sample as
detected and label it as malicious. Now, let us assume X denotes the random
variable that is defined as the number of scanners that detect a given sample as
malicious. Then, for T = 1, the combined probability can be derived as

which in turn can be written as
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In other words, the probability of a sample being detected by at least one
scanner is a summation of the probability of that sample being detected by
exactly 1, 2 and 3 scanners. This is also depicted in Figure 4.2(a), where we can
see the total white region consists of three types of smaller regions which depict
three components of the summation in the above equation. Therefore, we can
generalize this equation for T = t (where 1 ≤ t ≤ 3) as

Now, we have to find out how to calculate the probability P{X=i}. Let's
start with P{X=1}. This means, we have to calculate the probability that exactly
one scanner will detect the sample. We have the individual detection
probabilities as P1, P2, and P3 for scanner 1, scanner 2 and scanner 3 respectively.

(a)
T=
1

(b)
T=2 for the three cases.
Figure 4.2 Venn diagrams

(c)
T=
3
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P{X=1} can be described as the summation of the probabilities that only scanner 1
detects the sample, only scanner 2 detects the sample and only scanner 3 detects
the sample. Now, according to the rules of probabilities, we can say that the
probability that only scanner 1 detects the sample is P1(1-P2)(1-P3). Similarly, for
scanner 2 and scanner 3 the probabilities will be P2(1-P3)(1-P1) and P3(1-P1)(1-P2)
respectively. Therefore, we can write

Following similar reasoning, we can write

and

The reasoning behind these equations is also illustrated in Figure 4.2. Replacing
the values from equations (4.2), (4.3) and (4.4) into equation (4.1), we can easily
calculate the combined probability (CP) for a given T = t.
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4.2.2 N-Scanner CPM
In the previous section, we limited our discussion to only 3 scanners for ease of
understanding. Now, we can extend this 3-scanner model to an N-scanner
model. Figure 4.3 shows an N-scanner system.

Figure 4.3 An N-scanner parallel system.
For an N-scanner model with T = t (where 1 ≤ t ≤ N), equation (4.1)
becomes

Based on equations (4.2), (4.3) and (4.4), we can come up with a generalized Nscanner equation for the probability P{X=i} as

where

is the probability of

combination in

and

the scanner with index k (1 ≤ k ≤ i) in jth

is the probability of the scanner with index l (i+1 ≤ l ≤
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N) in all the other scanners that are not in jth combination. Substituting the value
of P{X=i} from equation (4.6) into equation (4.5) we get

Equation (4.7) can be used as the generic N-scanner equation for combined
detection probability when T = t.

4.2.3 CPM for Other Multi-Scanner Systems
So far we have considered only parallel system of scanners. In this section, we
will discuss other types of multi-scanner systems such as the serial system and
the mixed system and show how they only are special cases of the parallel
system of scanners.

4.2.3.1 Serial System
A serial system of scanners is a system of scanners where all the scanners are
connected serially, as depicted in Figure 4.4. The input sample is fed into the first
scanner and the output from the first scanner is fed into the second scanner and
so on. Again, we consider only binary outputs from the scanners. Therefore, by
feeding the output into the next scanner, we mean that if the sample is detected
as malicious (a 1-output), the sample is passed onto the next scanner to be
scanned. This process goes on until the scanner is utilized and only if all the
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scanner detect this sample as malicious, it is finally classified as malicious. On
the other hand, if the sample is detected as benign ( a 0-output), the sample is not
passed onto the next scanner and all the subsequent scanners automatically
report that sample as benign, eventually classifying the sample as benign.

Figure 4.4 An N-scanner serial system.

If we compare this system with the parallel system of scanners, we can
easily see that this serial system of scanners is nothing but a special case of the
parallel system of scanners, where the threshold value T is fixed at the total
number of scanners N. This means, only when all the scanners detect a specific
sample as malicious, the sample is classified as malicious. In all the other cases,
the sample is classified as benign. Therefore, we can use equation (4.7) by just
substituting t with N and calculating CP(N).
An alternative version of the serial system is also possible where instead
of passing the sample to the next scanner when it is detected as malicious and
blocking it when it is detected as benign, we can block it when it is detected as
malicious and pass it to the next scanner when it is detected as benign. In this
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case, the sample will be detected benign only when all the scanners have
detected it as benign and it will be detected as malicious if a single scanner
detects it as malicious. Again, if we compare this alternative serial system with
the parallel one, we find that this is nothing but a special case of the parallel
system where the threshold value T is fixed at the value of 1. Therefore, we can
use equation (4.7) to calculate CP(1).

4.2.3.2 Mixed System
So far, we have seen only pure parallel and serial system of scanners. There also
can be a third type of multi-scanner system, where there are both parallel and
serial parts in the system. We can call them a mixed system. Consider the
systems depicted in Figure 4.5 for a 3-scanner system. The system shown in

(a)

(b)

Figure 4.5 Two variations of a 3-scanner mixed system.
Figure 4.5(a) has scanner 1 and scanner 2 connected serially, and scanner 3 is
parallel to the serial system of scanner 1 and scanner 2. This system is in fact a
parallel system of scanners where one line in the parallel system is a serial
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system, which is also a special type of parallel system as we established in
section 4.1.3.1. Therefore, we can say that the mixed system is a parallel system
consisting of other smaller parallel systems. This means, we can use the same
equation (4.7) that we derived for parallel systems to derive the equation for a
particular mixed system. Figure 4.5(b) shows another variation of 3-scanner
mixed system. For an N-scanner system, obviously there can be many more
variations possible.

4.3

Greedy Heuristic Based Models

4.3.1

Greedy Approximation Model (GAM)

Instead of deriving a mathematical formula, the Greedy Approximation Model
(GAM) applies the greedy heuristic to approximately calculate the combined
probability CP(t) for a given threshold t. Here, the greedy heuristic is to start by
combining the highest t individual detection probabilities and moving along in a
decreasing order doing the same until less than t probabilities available. An
example would better explain the approach. Let's say we have P1, P2, P3 ... PN
individual detection probabilities available sorted in a decreasing order, that is,
P1 ≥ P2 ≥ P3 ≥ ... ≥ PN. To calculate CP(t), we initialize CP(t) to 0 and calculate P1 ×
P2 × P3 × ... × Pt and add to CP(t). For the next iteration, we calculate 1 - CP(t) and
multiply it with P2 × P3 × P4 × ... × Pt+1 and add the result to CP(t). This goes on till
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we add PN-t+1 × PN-t+2 × PN-t+3 × ... × PN × (1 - CP(t)) to CP(t). The final value of CP(t) is
our desired combined detection probability. We developed the Greedy
Approximation algorithm based on this approach, as shown in Figure 4.6. Here,
the parameters Lp and t refer to the list of individual detection probabilities and
threshold respectively and the resulting combined probability is denoted by CPt.

Figure 4.6 The Greedy Approximation algorithm.

4.3.2 Complementary Greedy Approximation Model (CGAM)
The Complementary Greedy Approximation Model (CGAM) applies a similar greedy
heuristic approach. But instead of applying it on the detection probabilities, it is
applied on the complements of the probabilities and again complemented to find
the desired combined probability. To understand the reasoning behind this
approach, we have to refer back to the Venn diagrams in Figure 4.2. In Figure
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4.2(a), we can clearly see that the combined probability of P1, P2 and P3 is shown
by the total white region. The area of this white region can be calculated in
another way also, that is, by subtracting area of the total grey region from the
area of the rectangle. Here, the area of the rectangle represents 1, since this is the
universal set, and the area of the grey region is the combined probability of the
complements of the probabilities, namely, (1-P1), (1-P2) and (1-P3). Figure 4.7
shows the Complementary Greedy Approximation algorithm.

Figure 4.7 The Complementary Greedy Approximation algorithm.

4.4

Accuracy Metrics

The simplest metric is called Accuracy (ACC) or Fraction Correct (FC) [55]. It
measures the fraction of all instances that are correctly categorized and is defined
by
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where TP, TN, FP, and FN refers to true positive, true negative, false positive,
and false negative respectively. In our experiments, we only calculate TP and FP.
But TP and FN together make the total number of malicious samples. Similarly,
TN and FP together makes the total number of benign samples. Therefore, we
can easily calculate FN and TN from TP and FP.

Another useful metric is the F1 score [56]. It considers both precision and
recall of the test to compute the score and is defined by

A third metric, called the Matthews Correlation Coefficient (MCC) [57], is used in
machine learning as measure of quality of binary classifications. It is generally
regarded as a balanced measure and is defined by

4.5

Ranking of Scanners

To identify the best subset of scanners for a given size M out of N (1 ≤ M ≤ N), we
need to rank the scanners based on a suitable criteria that can help in achieving
the maximum accuracy and select the top M scanners. But the only information
about the scanners is their detection rates. Therefore, we need to create an
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individual scoring system based on the true positive and false positive detection
probabilities for each scanner. Here, we propose to use the accuracy formula
(ACC) from section 4.4. Then, individual score for scanner i should be,

si

(8)

Based on this score, we can sort all the N scanners in a descending order.
Then, to get M best scanners, we can select top M scanners from the ordered set
of N scanners.

4.6

Numerical Simulation

To verify the accuracy of our models and to answer the questions mentioned in
section 4.1, we performed several numerical simulation experiments. We used
Python to develop small programs that can simulate the scanning of a set of
samples by a set of anti-virus scanners. In this section, we will describe the setup
of these experiments and their results in detail.
4.6.1 Simulation of the Models
We defined a hypothetical set of 1000 malicious and 1000 benign samples and 10
anti-virus scanners. We randomly decided whether a particular sample is
detected as malicious or not by a particular anti-virus scanner. Then, we
calculated the true positive rate and false positive rate for each anti-virus scanner
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as well as the combined true positive rate and false positive rate for all the
threshold values ranging from 1 to 10. We did the same using our models as
well. Then, we calculated the accuracy values both for the actual case and for our
models based on three metrics of evaluation, as described in section 4.4.

As mentioned earlier, we randomly decided whether a sample is detected
as malicious or not by an anti-virus scanner. To create different test sets with
different detection rates for the anti-virus scanners, we enforced different
maximum values so that all the anti-virus scanners will have a detection rate that
is below the maximum value for that test set. This means, for example, if the
maximum value is 90, all the anti-virus scanners (10 in our experiments) will
have a maximum detection rate of 0.9 or 90%. We varied the maximum value to
create all the test sets spanning all possible detection rates. The range of
maximum values for true positive rates was from 50 to 95 and the range of
maximum values for false positive rates was from 5 to 50.

To better illustrate our simulation results, we show the graphs of one
specific test case, where the true positive rate was limited to 80% and the false
positive rate was limited to 10%. Figure 4.8(a) shows the graphs of combined true
positive rates generated from the actual case and the models for different
threshold values ranging from 1 to 10. Similarly, Figure 4.8(b) shows the graphs
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combined false positive rates calculated from actual case and our models for
different threshold values.

(a)

(b)
Figure 4.8 Graphs of combined detection probabilities against different
threshold values.

Figure 4.9 shows the comparison of accuracy values resulting from the
actual values estimated using the actual optimum threshold and also using the
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threshold calculated from our models for the example test case using three
different evaluation metrics. We have also included the minimum accuracy levels
to show how our model predicated accuracy values perform against them. The
graph clearly indicates that all of the model predicted accuracy values are very
close to the actual maximum accuracy values.

Figure 4.9 Comparison of accuracy values using three evaluation metrics
based on simulation results.

To evaluate how our models perform against the actual cases, we varied
the limiting maximum values for randomization and created different test cases.
As mentioned earlier, the range of limiting maximum values for true positive
rates was from 50 to 95 and the range for false positive rates was from 5 to 50. We
varied the values with a step size of 5, creating total 10 × 10 = 100 test cases. Table
4.2 shows average deviation from the actual maximum accuracy value for all
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three models based on three evaluation metrics we used. Results from Table 4.2
indicate that CPM performs best among the models.

Table 4.2 Average Deviation from Maximum Accuracy
Metric Used
ACC
F1
MCC

CPM
0.03
0.04
0.06

GAM
0.1
0.12
0.18

CGAM
0.14
0.15
0.26

4.6.2 Simulation of Optimum Size for Scanner Set (Q)
The optimum size of the scanner set refers to the number of scanners in a scanner
set that achieves the maximum accuracy value among all available N scanners.
We have denoted it here as Q. Here, the goal of our simulation test is to
determine whether adding new scanners to a multi-scanner system can always
improve or maintain the maximum accuracy. In other words, if we have a total of
N scanners available, we want to answer the following question - should we use
all of them to achieve maximum accuracy (Q = N), or is it possible to reduce the
number of scanners needed to achieve maximum accuracy by removing some
scanners from the set (Q < N)?

In the simulation test, we vary the average false positive detection rate of
the scanners and calculate the value of Q. The value of N is selected as 10 like
before. The value of average false positive rate is varied from 0.01 to 0.1 with a
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step size of 0.01. We run the tests for each average false positive rate value 100
times to get an average estimate. Figure 4.10 (a) shows the percentage of times Q
is less than N out of all instances as we increase the average false positive rate of
scanners.

(a)

(b)
Figure 4.10 Trends of changes in Q vs. average false positive rate.
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We can see from the graph that the increase is almost linear and it
increases up to more than 50% when the average false positive rate is increased
up to 0.1. Figure 4.10 (b) shows the calculated average values of Q when N is 10,
as we increase the average false positive rate. The graph shows that the average
value of Q almost linearly decreases with the increase in average false positive
rate. Both of these graphs in Figure 4.10 verifies the fact that if the false positive
rate of the scanners are high enough, the number of scanners that will yield the
maximum accuracy can be lower than the total number of available scanners. In
other words, with a high enough false positive rate, it is not always beneficial to
add new scanners to the set of scanners in a multi-scanner system.

4.6.3 Simulation of the Ranking Approach
In section 4.5, we proposed a ranking system based on the accuracy score of
individual scanners to rank all the scanners and take top M to create a subset of
scanners. We performed simulation experiments to test how the performance of
this ranked subset fit into the range of maximum accuracy values achieved by
any M scanner subset.

Figure 4.11 shows the graph for a sample simulation test done to compare
the maximum accuracy values achieved by best combination, worst combination
and the combination consisting of top ranked scanners. The individual scanner
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true positive and false positive detection rates were randomized like the
previous simulation tests and were limited to a highest value. In this test case,
true positive rates were limited to 80% and false positive rates were limited to
5%. We can see from the graph that our ranking approach does much better than
the worst combination selected and performs almost at the same level as the best
combination for higher M values.

Figure 4.11 Comparison of maximum accuracy by best, worst and ranked
best combinations based on simulation results.

We executed similar simulation test 100 times to get an average estimate
of how our ranking approach performs. We found that on average our ranking
approach provides a combination that achieves a accuracy value that is 0.0195
lower than the maximum accuracy achieved by the best combination and 0.0655

78

higher than the maximum achieved by the worst combination. Here, we have
only included the evaluation results done using the first metric (ACC). Similar
evaluation could be done using the other two metrics as well.

4.7 Experimental Evaluation Using Real Data
4.7.1 Malware and Goodware Dataset
We collected a large data set of malware samples from VirusSign [58], which
generously provides with a significant amount of malware samples everyday in
return of a small payment. Our malware dataset consisted 38,789 malware
samples in total. Our goodware dataset consisted of 21624 benign portable
executable (PE) binary files collected from SourceForge [59]. We downloaded
these files by crawling the SourceForge website in order of user rating to ensure
they are not malicious. Table 4.3 lists the details of each of the malware and
goodware datasets.

Table 4.3 Malware and Goodware Dataset

Name
Malware
Dataset
Goodware
Dataset

Source

Number of
Samples

Period of
Collection

VirusSign

38,789

April 26 to April 29, 2014

SourceForge

21,624

July 20 to July 31, 2015
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We divided both the malware and goodware dataset further into training
and test sets. The training datasets are used to calculate individual true and false
detection probabilities (PT and PF) for each anti-virus scanner. These values are
used by our models to calculate combined detection probabilities (CPT(t) and
CPF(t)) according to our CPM formula (equation (4.7)) and GAM and CGAM
algorithms. Then, the test datasets are used to calculate the actual combined
detection probabilities (CPT(t) and CPF(t)) for each threshold t. Table 4.4 lists the
division of malware and goodware dataset into corresponding training sets and
test sets. We used multiple test sets of varying sizes by dividing the full test set to
add diversity into the experiments.

Table 4.4 Training and Test Sets
Name
Malware Training Set
Malware Test Set
Goodware Training Set
Goodware Test Set

Number of Samples
28,789
10,000
11,624
10,000

4.7.2 Experimental Setup
We used online multi-scanning service VirusTotal for our experiments.
VirusTotal generates scanning reports based on scanning performed by at most
55 anti-virus scanners (at the time of the writing). But not all the reports contain
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the same anti-virus scanners all the time. This is why we had to identify a set of
anti-virus scanners that are common to all the generated scanning reports. We
found that 21 anti-virus scanners (listed in Table 4.5) were common to all the
scanning reports.
Table 4.5 List of Anti-virus Scanners
Kaspersky
Antivir
Agnitum
Avast
AVG
Comodo
DrWeb

ESET-NOD32
GData
Ikarus
K7GW
McAfee-GW-Edition
Malwarebytes
Sophos

VBA32
VIPRE
TrendMicro-HouseCall
BitDefender
Emsisoft
NANO-Antivirus
Panda

To implement the experiment, we developed a small program in C#.NET
that is based on the VirusTotal API to generate the scanning reports from
VirusTotal and another small program in Python to parse and calculate our
desired combined detection probability and accuracy values from them. We also
implemented our models using Python.
4.7.3 Results and Analysis

Figure 4.12(a) shows the graphs of combined true positive detection probability
(CPT(t)) against threshold values (t) from 1 to 21. Here, we have divided the full
test set (both malware and goodware) into 5 test sets containing 2000 samples
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each. From the graphs, we can see that the actual combined true positive
detection rate varies from test to test. Among the graphs generated from the
models, CPM shows least amount of deviation from the actual trend. The other
two (GAM and CGAM) graphs deviate further in opposite directions. A similar
trend can be found in Figure 4.12(b), which demonstrates the graphs of
combined false positive detection probabilities (CPF(t)) against threshold values
(t) from 1 to 21.

We use these combined true and false positive detection probabilities to
calculate accuracy values according to three evaluation metrics from section 4.4
and use them to determine the optimum threshold. To add diversity in test sizes,
we created 3 test sets from the malware and goodware test set according to Table
4.6. Figure 4.13 shows the comparative graphs for these accuracy values for each
test set. The accuracy values calculated using the models are actually the actual
accuracy values for the model predicted optimum thresholds. Figure 4.13(a),
4.13(b) and 4.13(c) presents the comparative accuracy values for test set 1, test set
2 and test set 3 respectively. We can see that for all the test cases, the model
predicted accuracy values are very close to actual maximum accuracy values. We
also see that there is a very small difference in accuracy values among CPM,
GAM and CGAM, where CPM and GAM perform better in comparison to
CGAM.
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(a)

(b)

Figure 4.12 Comparison of graphs of combined detection probabilities
against threshold values generated from actual test cases and our models.
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(a)

(b)

(c)
Figure 4.13 Comparison of accuracy values using three evaluation
metrics based on real world (a) test set 1, (b) test set 2, and (c) test set 3.
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Table 4.6 Distribution of Test Sets for Combined Accuracy Test

Test Set
1
2
3

Number of
Malware Samples
4000
4000
2000

Number of Goodware
Samples
4000
2000
4000

Next, we perform all combination tests where we take a subset of M
scanners from all N scanners and calculate maximum accuracy values for the best
combination, the worst combination and the combination from top ranked
scanners. Figure 4.14 shows the graphs for this experiment done only on the test
set 1 from Table 4.6. The results for test set 2 and 3 also yield similar results and
omitted for space constraints. In Figure 4.14, we see that the ranking approach
yields accuracy values that are very close to the maximum accuracy values
achieved by the best combination and much higher than the maximum accuracy
achieved by the worst combination. We have also calculated an average among
all 3 test sets to find out the average difference of the accuracy values for the
combinations. We found that on average the maximum accuracy value calculated
using the ranking approach is lower than the maximum accuracy for the best
combination by 0.00164 and higher than the maximum accuracy for the worst
combination by 0.05468.
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Figure 4.14 Comparison of maximum accuracy by best, worst and ranked
best combinations based on real world dataset.

Another important observation from Figure 4.14 is that the accuracy
values tend to always increase with the increase of M. This is because the average
false positive rate for all the scanners is 0.00864 which is lower than 0.01. This
also verifies our simulation results from section 4.6.2, where we have seen that
for very low average false positive rates; Q is almost equal to N and the
probability of Q being lower than N is very low.
4.7.4 Runtime Analysis and Comparison of the Models
A comparison of the models in terms of runtime analysis is given in Table 4.7
and as you can see, CPM is far worse than both GAM and CGAM based on this
criterion. The main reason behind this is obviously the combinatorial component
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in the formula for CPM. We have calculated actual execution time from our
experiments for each model as well, which is also listed in Table 4.7. The
execution time has been calculated in an Intel Core i3 2.10 GHz laptop for a
scenario where N was assigned 20. We see that CPM takes almost more than 6
minutes to execute, whereas GAM and CGAM takes about 1 millisecond. This
means, CPM is not the best choice in terms of scalability and the greedy
approximation algorithms provide a good alternative. If we want to reduce the
execution time even more, we can consider using a subset of M scanners instead
of all N scanners, where M < N. If we want to make the best tradeoff between
scalability and accuracy, GAM should be our best choice.

Table 4.7 Comparison of the Models

Criteria
Runtime
Complexity
Actual
Execution Time

CPM
O(N2

)

402.55
Seconds

GAM

CGAM

O(NlgN)

O(NlgN)

0.00099
Seconds

0.001
Seconds

4.8 Related Work
4.8.1 Multi-scanner Architecture
Very few research papers have been published that focus solely on combining
multiple scanners to achieve higher accuracy. Morales et al. [60] investigated
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whether a single anti-malware program is sufficient to detect and clean all
malware present on a system. They experimentally showed that a single antimalware program is not sufficient. Their experiments used a combination of 3
well known anti-malware programs in different permutations and they followed
a serial architecture. Though in a limited fashion, their results showed that
combining multiple anti-malware programs achieve better recall and false
negative rates. Oberheide et al. [61] presented a new model for malware
detection on end hosts based on providing anti-virus as an in-cloud network
service. Their model used multiple, heterogeneous detection engines in parallel,
a technique termed as `N-version protection'. They claimed that their approach
provides several benefits including better detection of malicious software,
enhanced

forensics

capabilities,

retrospective

detection,

and

improved

deployability and management. To verify their model, they constructed and
deployed an in-cloud antivirus system called CloudAV. CloudAV includes a
lightweight, cross-platform host agent and a network service with ten anti-virus
engines and two behavioral detection engines. They evaluated the performance,
scalability, and efficacy of the system using data from a real-world deployment
lasting more than six months and a database of 7220 malware samples covering a
one year period. The results showed that CloudAV provides 35% better detection
coverage against recent threats compared to a single anti-virus engine and a 98%
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detection rate across the full dataset. Cukier et al. [62] presented empirical
evidence that detection capabilities are considerably improved by diversity with
AVs and their findings also showed that none of the single anti-virus software
achieved perfect detection rate.

4.8.2 Collaborative Malware Detection
There has been some research on the collaborative approach in detecting
malware. Schmidt et al. [63] presented a collaborative malware detection
approach to reduce false negative rate for Android-based malware detection by
performing static analysis of executables and sharing detection information
among neighboring nodes. Fung et al. [64] presented a collaborative decision
making approach for malware detection systems. They proposed a decision
model called RevMatch [65], where collaborative malware detection decisions
are made based on the scanning history with multiple anti-virus systems. They
claimed that the experimental evaluation of their model shows significant
improvement over any single anti-virus engine. RAVE [66] is a centralized
collaborative malware scanning system for email infrastructures where email
correspondence is used to contact multiple agents for malware scanning and a
voting mechanism is used to make the final decisions. Marchetti et al. [67]
presented a distributed peer-to-peer architecture for collaborative malware and
intrusion detection focusing more on dependability and load-balancing issues.
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Similar approach was proposed by Colajanni et al. [68]. Lu et al. [69] presented
SCMA, a distributed malware analysis system with the goal of better
collaboration and scalability.

4.8.3 Multi-AV Scanning Services and Software
There are free online public services that provide scanning reports from multiple
anti-virus scanners. VirusTotal [8], a Google subsidiary, is the most prominent
among these services. VirusTotal uses the command-line versions of 55 anti-virus
scanners (at the time of writing) to scan a single file and include the results
returned by each scanner into an aggregated report. In addition to telling
whether a given anti-virus solution detected a submitted file, it displays the exact
detection label returned by each engine. This service is mainly useful to the antivirus vendors and to those private users who wants a second opinion. Among
other such services, there are Jotti [70], VirSCAN [71], File2Scan [72], and
Metadefender [73], where File2Scan and Metadefender are paid services. There
are also multi-AV scanning client tools such as HerdProtect [74], HitmanPro [75],
SecureAPlus [76], and Multi-AV [77].

4.8.4 Commercial AV Scanners
Most of the anti-virus vendors use their own proprietary malware detection
engine which usually includes a signature database, a heuristic-based detection
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engine, and a reputation-based detection system. A few of them, namely
Emsisoft [78] and G Data [79], use a dual-engine technology where each scan
passes through two engines.

4.9

Summary

With the ever increasing amount of activities in the Internet and the world
moving into an era of cloud computing, the protection from malicious content
remains a top priority of cyber security. And the first step in this protection
mechanism is detection of malware and other malicious content. In this chapter,
we provided a new set of guidelines in achieving the optimum detection
capabilities of malware using multiple anti-virus scanners. We have presented
three theoretical models to capture the behavior of a multi-scanning malware
detection system based on only the individual detection capabilities or ratings of
the member scanners in the system. These models help us in finding the
optimum threshold to achieve maximum accuracy in an N-scanner system,
which our experimental evaluation verifies. Furthermore, we discovered that
with high enough false positive rates, addition of new scanners might be
disadvantageous and ranking the scanners based on accuracy scores is a good
approximation for finding a best subset of scanners. All of these findings along
with our models together make up a set of important guidelines for any multi-
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scanner detection system consisting of only third-party anti-virus scanners where
very little information is available about them, such as VirusTotal.

In future, we anticipate further extending this work into other areas of
malicious content detection, such as intrusion detection and anti-spam filtering.
Our models do not take into account any specific detail of a single scanner or
filter, rather take them as black boxes and only take into account their detection
probabilities based on prior detection history. Even the past detection history
does not have to be available at hand. Only an approximate or calculated
detection rate or quality score is necessary. Therefore, incorporating the intrusion
detection or anti-spam filters instead of an anti-virus scanner into a multi-filter
system is quite straight forward. The only difficulty here is that there is no
existing multi-filter system of intrusion detection or anti-spam filters currently
available like VirusTotal or other multi-AV scanning services. We intend to
include an extensive experimental evaluation of our models based on popular
intrusion detection and anti-spam filters in future.
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CHAPTER 5

DETECTION OF HTTP-BASED BOTNET C&C TRAFFIC
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we introduce an anomaly detection based approach to detect
HTTP-based botnet C&C communication which focuses on how to prevent the
botnet from upgrading itself to avoid detection. That means, we want to make it
very hard for the botmaster to mimic the legitimate HTTP communication and
hide C&C activities. Our approach is based on identifying anomaly in client
generated HTTP request packets as well as DNS server generated response
packets for the same HTTP communication. Based on some initial analysis of
both legitimate and botnet C&C HTTP traffic, we have selected some statistical
features that are suitable for detecting anomaly in a large set of captured HTTP
traffic. These features are based on patterns emerging from HTTP request
packets, more specifically, the URL string that is used to fetch data from an
HTTP server. Using these features we primarily run an unsupervised anomaly
detection algorithm to distinguish between HTTP request packets generated by
human actions and HTTP request packets generated by a software bot, both
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legitimate and malicious. Then, to further narrow down the isolated packets, we
extract the primary domain names involved in those packets and run a semisupervised anomaly detection algorithm using a selected set of features based on
the DNS server response packets that particularly contain resolved IP address list
(A or AAAA record). Eventually, we are left with a list of domain names that are
highly probable to be involved in malicious C&C communication.

5.2 Details of Methodology
HTTP botnets try to hide their C&C communication in the massive HTTP traffic
generated and transmitted over the Internet everyday by mimicking the
behaviors of a legitimate Web communication. Our idea is to find the features
that are very hard for the botnets to mimic and use those features to effectively
isolate the C&C traffic. Therefore, the first step in our method is to select the
feature set. We have selected a feature set based on HTTP request URL field and
DNS response packet fields. Then, we apply anomaly detection algorithms on
the feature set in unsupervised (for HTTP request URL) and semi-supervised (for
DNS response) fashion. There are two stages in the anomaly detection part. In
the first stage, our goal is to isolate the software-agent-generated HTTP packets
from the browser-generated HTTP packets resulting from human browsing
activities. For this purpose, we focus on the HTTP request URL patterns. Here,
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the motivation of our approach is that human browsing activities tend to
generate diverse and noisy HTTP traffic, whereas the software-agent-generated
automated HTTP traffic tends to follow certain algorithms written by the
software developer. In other words, browser-generated HTTP traffic can be
regarded as human-generated manual traffic, where the human user effectively
types or clicks through the URLs; on the other hand, the software-agentgenerated HTTP traffic can be regarded as non-human-generated bot-like traffic,
where the software agent acts like a bot. Here, we should mention that the
browser itself can also act like a software agent or bot and generate bot-like
traffic and we have considered this into our approach. In the second stage, the
goal is to isolate the botnet C&C domains from the legitimate Web domains.
There are two steps in this stage. In the first step, we extract the primary domains
from all the IP addresses. The concept of primary domain is discussed later in
this section. In the second step, we extract the DNS response features from the
dataset for each domain. Then we apply one anomaly detection algorithm
(Chebyshev's inequality) to this set, along with our training dataset, in a semisupervised fashion. Figure 5.1 shows the steps in our method and we describe
the details in the next subsections.
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Figure 5.1 The main steps in our detection process.

5.2.1 Feature Selection

1) HTTP Request URL Features
The HTTP request URL features are used to isolate the human-generated manual
HTTP traffic and non-human-generated automated HTTP traffic.
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a) Total number of distinct URLs
Automated HTTP traffic usually has a lower value for this feature, unless they
either generate a distinct URL every time or use many dummy URLs that
effectively point to the same set of original URLs. In the latter cases, the value
can be too high. Human users usually visit many distinct URL for the same
website, which means the value should be high but within a certain limit. Using
this feature in our detection method, we can make the botmaster to work a bit
harder to mimic normal traffic and hide their activities.

b) Frequencies of request URLs
It is hard to come up with a frequency pattern that mimics human browsing
activities. Normally a software agent either will reuse the same URL over and
over again or generate a distinct URL every time. We use the mean and the
standard deviation values for the set of frequencies as features into the anomaly
detection algorithm.

c) Lengths of request URLs
To make it even harder for the botmaster to generate pseudo-browsing pattern
that resembles human browsing pattern, we take the request URL lengths into
account. A website usually has a hierarchy of web pages with distinct names,
which makes all the request URLs different in length. On the other hand,
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software-agent-generated URLs generally have the same length, although they
can be distinct (for example, if the URLs are encrypted). A botmaster has to
randomize not only the URLs, but also the URL lengths to pass this test. We use
the standard deviation of all the observed URL lengths as the feature.

d) Order of the request URLs
We take into account the predictiveness of the request URLs by calculating the
information entropy of the order of the occurrence of the URLs. We assign to
each URL an increasing number starting from 1 and generate a numeric sequence
string that denotes the order of occurrence of the URLs. Then, we generate a
signed differential number string from the sequence string that shows movement
between consecutive URL numbers in the sequence. The following example will
better illustrate the process: Suppose we have the numbers 1 through 9 to
represent 9 distinct URLs. Then for an example URL sequence string 1231345231,
the differential string will be +1+1+1-2+2+1+1-3+1-2. That is, it starts with an
initial value of 0 and calculates the difference from the first number in the URL
sequence string. Then, it will append the difference between the second number
and the first number, append the difference between the third number and the
second number, and continue appending until all the numbers are used. To
calculate the entropy of this string, we use Shannon's formula, as given by
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Equation (5.1), where X is a discrete random variable with possible values {x1, …,
xn} and H(X) is the entropy.
(5.1)

2) DNS Response Features
The DNS response features are used to further isolate the legitimate softwareagent-targeted domains and botnet C&C domains.

a) Number of distinct IP addresses per response
Botmasters try to evade detection of C&C domains. Therefore, they tend to use
IP flux and domain flux techniques. That means, the IP addresses associated with
a domain can vary highly as well as there can be many domains for the same
C&C server. Although the total number of distinct IP addresses associated with a
single domain might be large, the number of IP addresses per DNS response
packet can be lower. On the other hand, large load-balancing Web domains tend
to have a fixed high number of IP addresses per DNS response packet.

b) Total number of distinct IP addresses
We need the total number of IP addresses to check reuse of IP addresses per
domain.
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c) Mean TTL (Time to Live) value
The mean TTL value is used to check the frequency of change between IP
addresses for a domain.

d) Total number of distinct ASN
Large load-balancing Web domains should have the IP addresses in a more
concentrated distribution, whereas IP flux techniques force the botnet domain IP
addresses to be sparsely distributed. We distinguish them by calculating the
number of Autonomous System Numbers (ASN) for the whole IP address set. A
legitimate Web domain should have most of the IP addresses in a single
autonomous system, whereas a malicious domain using IP flux techniques
should have the IP addresses distributed over many different autonomous
systems.

5.2.2 Feature Extraction
We calculate the HTTP request features per source-destination IP address pair,
where the source IP address is the client IP address and the destination IP
address is the server IP address. We call a single source-destination IP address
pair and the corresponding properties and features a Conversation. Since the
features are statistical in nature, we need to have at least a minimum number of
HTTP request packets per conversation to calculate the true value of each
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feature. We set this minimum value to 20. After the first stage is complete, we
extract the primary domain name from the hostname field for each conversation
and merge them to discard duplicates. The domain name extraction process is
discussed in the next subsection. Then, for each domain we find all the DNS
response packets and extract the DNS features from them.

5.2.3 Domain Extraction
In this work, a primary domain name refers to a domain name with all the
subdomains after second or third level domain name stripped. For example, the
primary domain name for my.example.com will be example.com, whereas the
primary domain name for my.example.co.uk will be example.co.uk. This
technique is used in both the steps in the second stage of our method, where we
extract primary domain names from each conversation and also from each DNS
response packet.

5.2.4 Anomaly Detection Methods
We have two different stages where we need to use anomaly detection. In the
first stage for HTTP request features, we use three different anomaly detection
methods independently in an unsupervised manner to compare between them.
In the second stage for DNS response features, we only use the first anomaly
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detection method based on Chebyshev's inequality in a semi-supervised manner.
A brief overview of all three techniques is given below.

1) Chebyshev's Inequality
The anomaly detection method based on Chebyshev's inequality can be used in
both unsupervised and semi-supervised manner. This technique is particularly
suitable when (1) the distribution of the available data is unknown or an
experimenter does not want to make assumptions about its distribution, and (2)
it is expected that the observations are independent from one another. The
formula for Chebyshev's inequality is

Where X is a random variable, E(X) is its expected value and k > 0 is a parameter.
This formula establishes an upper bound for the percentage of data points with
value more than k standard deviations away from the population mean. As
proposed by Amidan et al. [80], we use a two-stage approach to detect outliers.
In the first stage, we use an upper bound of 0.1 (k = 3.16) to find more obvious
outliers. Then in the second stage, after discarding the outliers from the first
stage, we select a much smaller upper bound of 0.01 (k = 10) to fine tune the
detection process. Following their approach, we generate the upper bound and
lower bound for the outlier detection value (ODV) for each feature. But we
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observe that the lower bound of the ODV values always become negative
according to the formula. To maintain better symmetry, we include the inverse
values of the existing features into the feature set and calculate ODV values for
them as well. An instance is considered outlier when at least one of the feature
values falls outside of the ODV bounds.
2) One-class Support Vector Machine
One-class Support Vector Machines (SVM) are a semi-supervised version of
traditional Support Vector Machines. We use the extended version of the semisupervised one-class SVM such that it can be used for unsupervised anomaly
detection as proposed by Amer et al. in [81]. Instead of implementing it from
scratch, we use the implementation by RapidMiner Studio [82] that follows the
same method. It generates an outlier value greater than 1 for outliers in a dataset.

3) Nearest Neighbor based Local Outlier Factor
This anomaly detection algorithm calculates an outlier score based on the local
outlier factor (LOF) implementation proposed by Breunig et al. [83].Like the
previous one, we use the implementation by RapidMiner Studio [82] for this one
as well. Here also a normal instance has an outlier value of approximately 1,
while outliers have values greater than 1.
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5.2.5 Detection Process
Our detection method is a cumulative process on the captured packets as they
are accumulated at a network point such as an ISP router. That means, we don't
discard anything as completely benign and the relevant information from all the
packets is retained. As illustrated in Figure 5.1, the packets go through the steps
into the next stages. If the packet is malicious and belongs to a C&C
communication, it should go through all the steps and finally get detected. If the
packet is from a benign and legitimate HTTP communication, at some point in
the steps it will stop going to the next stage, but still the extracted information
will be retained as part of the training set. Note that there is the possibility of
false negative in the current round, in which the packet is malicious and belongs
to a C&C communication, but does not get detected because of insufficient
feature values. We want to point out that in this case the conversation along with
its feature values is still retained for future review and not ruled out completely.
As we capture more similar packets from the same C&C communication, it will
eventually get picked by our detection process. This approach ensures that no
C&C communication will be able to bypass our detection scheme completely all
the time. The detection might be delayed but eventually the malicious
communication will be captured. Note that the storage requirements to retain the
conversations are significantly less since we are not storing the entire packet.
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5.3 Experimental Evaluation
5.3.1 Implementation
All the processes in the flowchart of Figure 5.1 can be considered as separate
modules in our implementation of the overall scheme. We implemented the
feature extraction modules in Java using the jNetPcap packet parsing library [84].
The HTTP packet parser is already supported by jNetPcap, but we had to
develop our own DNS packet parser on top of the existing support for packet
parsing from jNetPcap. The domain extraction module is also part of the same
Java code. One of the DNS features involves calculating the number of distinct
ASN. We used the Team Cymru IP to ASN lookup [85] service for this purpose.
For anomaly detection modules, we implemented three anomaly detection
methods, namely, Chebyshev's inequality, one-class support vector machine, and
nearest neighbor based local outlier factor algorithms.
Table 5.1 RapidMiner Implementation Configurations

Algorithm

1-class SVM

NN-LOF

Description
Parameter
SVM Type
Kernel Type
Beta
Epsilon
Auto Gamma Tuning
K-min
K-max
Measure Types
Mixed Measure
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Value
Eta 1-class
RBF
0.3
0.001
True
10
20
Mixed Measures
Mixed Euclidean Distance

The first one is implemented from scratch by us as part of the same Java
code we developed. The other two machine learning algorithms were
implemented using RapidMiner Studio [82] by RapidMiner which provides
support for many popular machine learning algorithms.

Table 5.1 lists the

parameters used for each of the algorithm implementations.
5.3.2 Data Collection
The first part of our anomaly detection experiment, namely the anomaly
detection in HTTP request traffic, is unsupervised in nature. Therefore, we
needed a huge amount of unlabeled real world HTTP traffic for our experimental
evaluation. We used a partial dataset from Clemson University campus network
traffic [86] that was collected from May to June in 2013. This dataset consisted of
general day-to-day Web browsing traffic captured for 7 days and filtered to
remove probable malicious traffic from well-known suspicious domains. The
total size of the dataset is 271 GB and it contained over 9 million HTTP request
packets. The traffic was anonymized and HTTP payloads were truncated for
privacy reasons, but we only needed the HTTP request headers. Therefore, this
dataset was perfectly suitable for our experiment.
The second part of our anomaly detection, namely the anomaly detection
in DNS response traffic, is semi-supervised in nature. That means, we needed a
training data set of DNS response packets that will help construct the model
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representing normal behavior. Our goal is to distinguish between large loadsharing Web domains and botnet C&C domains. Therefore, we generated the
normal DNS response traffic by crawling the top 500 websites in the world
according to the Alexa ranking [87]. We crawled for 3 hours every day for a
month to remove any kind of bias in the dataset. To reduce the size of the dataset
we only retained the DNS traffic. The final dataset contained 97468 DNS
response packets.
Table 5.2 Collected HTTP Botnet Families
1. Alina
2. Andromeda
3. Beebone
4. Carberp
5. Citadel
6. Cutwail
7. Dofoil
8. Dorifel
9. Dyre
10. Expiro
11. Festi

12. Harnig
13. Hiloti
14. Medfos
15. Mirage
16. Njw0r
17. Pushdo
18. Renos
19. Smoke
20. Ubot
21. Umbra
22. Vobfus

23. Weelsof
24. Winwebsec
25. Xpaj
26. Xtreme
27. Zegost
28. ZeroAccess
29. ZeroLocker
30. ZeuS
31. Zwangi

To effectively evaluate our method, we needed a test dataset of known
botnet C&C traffic. We collected binary samples (and already captured C&C
traffic in some cases as well) for 31 HTTP based botnet families from various
sources. Table 5.2 shows the list of botnet families. The samples were a bit old,
but they were still useful since they were still generating the HTTP request
packets while being executed even if the C&C servers were already down. In
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some cases, the DNS server was responding with NXDOMAIN responses. We
removed those packets from our experimental dataset. Therefore, the available
test dataset was good enough for our experimental evaluation. There were in
total 8258 HTTP request packets and 689 DNS response packets as part of the
C&C communication in total.

5.4 Results and Analysis
We evaluated our method by generating the overall false negative and false
positive ratios over the complete dataset of benign and malicious domains. After
running our experiment, we could accurately count the number of benign and
malicious C&C domains involved in the traffic dataset. Tables 5.3 and 5.4 list the
results of the experiment.
From Table 5.3, we can see that Chebyshev's inequality performs best as
the anomaly detection approach used in terms of false negative ratios.
Chebyshev's inequality based approach detects almost 94% of all the malicious
C&C domains, whereas the other two methods detect more than 80% of them.
Even though it does not look very high in terms of detection rate, it is still very
good considering the fact that we are detecting these small number of C&C
domains amongst an extremely large number of legitimate domains. From Table
5.4, we can see that the one-class SVM based approach performs best in terms of
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false positive ratios, though all three of them have quite small percentage of false
positives, considering the huge number of packets and corresponding domains
are being scanned.
Table 5.3 Detection Results (False Negative)

Anomaly Detection
Approach Used
Chebyshev's Inequality
1-class SVM
NN-LOF

Total
134
134
134

Malicious (C&C) Domains
Detected
FN (%)
125
6.71
111
17.16
101
19.40

Table 5.4 Detection Results (False Positive)

Anomaly Detection
Approach Used
Chebyshev's Inequality
1-class SVM
NN-LOF

Benign Domains
Detected
338
293
305

Total
7613
7613
7613

FP (%)
4.43
3.84
4.04

The main reason behind the slightly larger false negative ratio is that some
of the malicious C&C domains did not have sufficient number of communicating
packets to get them detected. As we mentioned earlier, our method has the
requirement of observing a minimum number of HTTP request packets to
calculate the true feature values which will accurately represent the behavior and
pattern that we are looking for among the participating legitimate and malicious
hosts. After some initial tests, we found that 20 is an appropriate value for this
minimum number and we have used it throughout our experiments. We note
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that varying this number will result in different false negative and false positive
ratios. Finding the optimum threshold requires an extensive evaluation process.
We intend it to be a part of our future work.

5.5 Related Work
A significant amount of research work can be found related to HTTP-based
botnet detection and botnet detection in general. However, only a small portion
of them focus solely on detecting C&C traffic. We can roughly divide them into
two main categories: specific HTTP-based botnet detection methods and generic
botnet detection methods.
To our best knowledge, there have been only a few existing works
focusing solely on HTTP-based botnet detection. Ashley [88] presented an
algorithm that uses repeated HTTP connections to detect botnet C&C activity.
The algorithm works best if the bot polls the C&C server very frequently. Brezo
et al. [89] used several supervised machine learning algorithms to develop a
model capable of classifying both botnet and legitimate traffic. Chen et al. [90]
combined both Web traffic and domain analysis to detect Web-based botnets
with fast-flux domains. Cai et al. [91] focused on HTTP-based botnet's C&C
patterns to classify network traffic into clusters. Yamauchi et al. [92] proposed a
detection technique for HTTP-based botnets using Support Vector Machines
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(SVM). Venkatesh et al. [93] presented a detection method based on hidden semiMarkov model using TCP-based SNMP MIB variables. Matthew et al. [94]
proposed a Genetic Algorithm based layered approach to detect attacks
conducted by HTTP botnets. Zarras et al. proposed BotHound [95] which uses
perceivable minute differences in different implementation of the HTTP protocol
to generate models for both malicious and benign requests and thereby classifies
HTTP-based malware. We observe that none of the previous researchers have
used an anomaly based approach to distinguish legitimate and malicious HTTP
communication in order to detect HTTP-based C&C communication.
The field of generic botnet detection is too wide to discuss here in detail.
Therefore, we will only briefly overview the detection techniques that are more
relevant to our approach, namely, the anomaly or other machine learning based
techniques. BotSniffer [96] presented anomaly based detection algorithms based
on spatial-temporal correlation and similarity properties of botnet command and
control activities. Appendix B of BotSniffer [96] proposed to identify HTTP C&C
channels by detecting a repeating and regular visiting pattern from one single
bot. BotMiner [97] used a similar approach to cluster network traffic based on
similarity. BotHunter [98] used a real-time dialog correlation engine that
investigates evidence of botnet life-cycle phases. Lu et al. [99] proposed to detect
by clustering botnet traffic based on N-gram feature selection. Wurzinger et al.
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[100] presented a system that automatically generates detection models from
network traffic traces recorded from actual bot instances. Strayer et al. [101]
detected botnets by examining flow characteristics such as bandwidth, duration,
and packet timing for evidence of botnet command and control activity. Reiter et
al. [102] proposed a method called "TAMD" which aggregates traffic flows of
internal hosts of a network to find similar communication patterns to external
networks. We see that all of these generic botnet detection techniques also focus
solely on different types of C&C patterns and statistical features instead of
legitimate communication.
There have been a few attempts to model the Web traffic to identify
anomaly and thereby detect malicious traffic. Estevez-Tapiador et al. [103] used
Markov chains to model the HTTP network traffic. Their approach detects
attacks carried over HTTP and is not meant to detect botnet C&C traffic. Xie et al.
[104] used a similar hidden Markov model technique based on inter-arrival time
of HTTP requests to detect pseudo Web behavior. Their work focuses on
modeling the user session correctly and thereby detects anomaly. Spectrogram
[105] presented a model and sensor framework using a mixture of Markovchains which is able to detect Web-layer code-injection attacks. The difference
between these works and our approach is that, ours focuses more on
distinguishing between normal legitimate Web traffic and botnet C&C traffic,
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rather than detecting general anomalies in the entire Web traffic. Therefore, our
technique might fail to detect other types of attacks carried over HTTP, but will
be able to identify botnet C&C traffic.

5.6 Summary
In this chapter, we presented an anomaly detection based detection approach for
the HTTP-based botnet C&C communication. The main strength of our approach
is that it is able to exploit the limitations and weaknesses of a botnet system in
our favor to reveal its presence. We believe that this approach will be able to
detect not only the present day known botnets but also any future unknown
botnet with better capabilities. To verify this, we plan to extend our work to
include real time traffic capturing and monitoring in a live network that will
include honeypots to attract bot infection.
Another possible extension of our work will be to evaluate our approach
using other anomaly detection techniques currently available varying the
minimum packet count requirement as mentioned earlier.
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CHAPTER 6

CONCLUDING REMARKS
This dissertation provided some new directions towards revealing malicious
contents hidden in the Internet. We presented an automated system for collection
and analysis of malware hidden inside online advertisements, which can be
detected and verified through any online multi-AV scanning services using our
proposed multi-scanner model based optimum configurations with maximum
accuracy. We presented a game theoretic model of the malvertising inspection
problem that can provide guidelines for ad networks to best utilize their
resources to mitigate the problem of malvertising. We also presented an anomaly
detection based solution approach for the extremely difficult problem of
detecting HTTP-based botnet command and control communication.

Through the proposed solutions in this dissertation, we have tackled
important problems in four different areas of the malicious content research
landscape. We believe that we have been successful in contributing significantly
in furthering the progress of research in the field of network security. In future,
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we plan to further extend our work by applying our solutions to other related
problems of malicious content detection.

115

BIBLIOGRAPHY
[1]

B. Johnson, "Internet companies face up to 'malvertising' threat," The
Guardian, published on September 25, 2009, available at
http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2009/sep/25/malvertising.

[2]

L. Zeltser, "Malvertising: some examples of malicious ad campaigns,"
available at https://zeltser.com/malvertising-malicious-ad-campaigns.

[3]

N. Bilogorskiy, "HuffingtonPost serving malware via AOL ad-Network,"
published
on
January
5,
2015,
available
at
http://www.cyphort.com/huffingtonpost-serving-malware.

[4]

J.C. Chen, B. Li, "Evolution of exploit kits," Trend Micro white paper,
available at https://www.trendmicro.com/cloud-content/us/pdfs/securityintelligence/white-papers/wp-evolution-of-exploit-kits.pdf.

[5]

Malvertising,
published
on
April
6,
2016,
available
https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/info-notes/malvertising.

[6]

GeoEdge website, available at http://www.geoedge.com/.

[7]

State
of
Search
Marketing
Report
2012,
available
at
http://c.ymcdn.com/sites/www.sempo.org/resource/resmgr/members_onl
y/SEMPO_2012_State_Of_Search_M.pdf.

[8]

VirusTotal, available at https://www.virustotal.com.

[9]

Requests: HTTP for
requests.org/en/latest.

[10]

XML and HTML with Python, available at http://lxml.de.

[11]

Adblockparser
0.2,
adblockparser/0.2.

[12]

EasyList, available at https://easylist.adblockplus.org/en.

Humans,

available

116

available

at

at

at

http://docs.python-

https://pypi.python.org/pypi/

[13]

Adblock Plus, available at https://adblockplus.org/.

[14]

Selenium
WebDriver
API,
available
python.readthedocs.org/en/latest/api.html.

[15]

VirusTotal Public API v2.0, available at https://www.virustotal.com/
en/documentation/public-api/.

[16]

A.K. Sood and R.J. Enbody, "Malvertising – exploiting web advertising,"
Computer Fraud and Security, Volume 2011, Issue 4, April 2011, Pages 1116.

[17]

S. Mansfield-Devine, "The dark side of advertising," Computer Fraud and
Security, Volume 2014, Issue 11, November 2014, Pages 5-8.

[18]

T. Zhang, H. Zhang, and F. Gao, "A malicious advertising detection
scheme based on the depth of URL strategy," in proceedings of Sixth
International Symposium on Computational Intelligence and Design
(ISCID), October 2013.

[19]

Google's anti-malvertising
malvertising.com.

[20]

Y. M. Wang, D. Beck, X. Jiang, R. Roussev, C. Verbowski, S. Chen, and S.
King, "Automated web patrol with strider honeymonkeys," in proceedings
of the Network and Distributed System Security Symposium (pp. 35-49),
February 2006.

[21]

J. Zhuge, T. Holz, X. Han, C. Song, and W. Zou, "Collecting autonomous
spreading malware using high-interaction honeypots," in Information and
Communications Security (pp. 438-451), Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2007.

[22]

J. Nazario, "PhoneyC: a virtual client honeypot," in proceedings of the 2nd
USENIX conference on Large-scale exploits and emergent threats: botnets,
spyware, worms, and more, pp. 6-6, 2009.

[23]

C. Kolbitsch, B. Livshits, B. Zorn, and C. Seifert, "Rozzle: De-cloaking
internet malware," in IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP), pp.
443-457, 2012.

[24]

K.Z. Chen, G. Gu, J. Zhuge, J. Nazario, and X. Han, "WebPatrol:
Automated collection and replay of web-based malware scenarios," in

website,

117

available

at

at

http://selenium-

http://www.anti-

proceedings of the 6th ACM Symposium on Information, Computer and
Communications Security, pp. 186-195, 2011.
[25]

Y-D. Lin, C-Y. Lee, Y-S. Wu, P-H. Ho, F-Y. Wang, and Y-L. Tsai, "Active
versus passive malware collection," Computer 47, no. 4 (2014): 59-65.

[26]

C.H. Tseng, S. Wang, S-C. Wang, and T-Y. Juang, "Proactive malware
collection and classification system: How to collect and classify useful
malware samples?," in International Conference on Information Science,
Electronics and Electrical Engineering (ISEEE), vol. 3, pp. 1846-1849, 2014.

[27]

Annual Security Report, Cisco, 2016.

[28]

Hacking communities in the Deep Web, Infosec Institute, published on
May 15, 2015, available at http://resources.infosecinstitute.com/ hackingcommunities-in-the-deep-web/.

[29]

J. Segura, and E. Aseev, "Operation Fingerprint: A look into several
Angler
exploit
kit
malvertising
campaigns,"
available
at
https://blog.malwarebytes.com/threat-analysis/2016/03/ofp.

[30]

"Just-in-time malware assembly: advanced evasion techniques," white
paper by Invincea, available at https://www.invincea.com/2015/07/ whitepaper-just-in-time-malware-assembly-advanced-evasion-techniques/.

[31]

Massive AdGholas malvertising campaigns use Steganography and file
whitelisting
to
hide
in
plain
sight,
available
at
https://www.proofpoint.com/uk/threat-insight/post/massive-adgholasmalvertising-campaigns-use-steganography-and-file-whitelisting-to-hidein-plain-sight.

[32]

A. Zaharia, "The ultimate guide to Angler exploit kit for non-technical
people,"
published
on
May
18,
2016,
available
at
https://heimdalsecurity.com/blog/ultimate-guide-angler-exploit-kit-nontechnical-people/.

[33]

M. N. Sakib, and C.-T. Huang, "Automated collection and analysis of
malware
disseminated
via
online
advertising,"
in
IEEE
Trustcom/BigDataSE/ISPA 2015(Vol. 1, pp. 1411-1416), August 2015.

[34]

N. Provos, P. Mavrommatis, M. A. Rajab, and F. Monrose, "All your
iframes point to us," in USENIX Security Symposium, 2008.

118

[35]

L. Invernizzi, S. Benvenuti, P. M. Comparetti, M. Cova, C. Kruegel, and G.
Vigna, "Evilseed: A guided approach to finding malicious web pages," in
IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, 2012.

[36]

Z. Li, S. Alrwais, Y. Xie, F. Yu, and X. Wang, "Finding the linchpins of the
dark web: a study on topologically dedicated hosts on malicious web
infrastructures," in IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, 2013.

[37]

T. Taylor, X. Hu, T. Wang, J. Jang, M.P. Stoecklin, F. Monrose, and R.
Sailer, "Detecting malicious exploit kits using tree-based similarity
searches," in proceedings of the Sixth ACM Conference on Data and
Application Security and Privacy (pp. 255-266), March 2016.

[38]

B. Stock, B. Livshits, and B. Zorn, "Kizzle: A signature compiler for exploit
kits," Technical Report MSR-TR-2015-12, Microsoft Research, February
2015.

[39]

G. Wang, J.W. Stokes, C. Herley, and D. Felstead, "Detecting malicious
landing pages in Malware Distribution Networks," in 43rd Annual
IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable Systems and
Networks (DSN), June 2013.

[40]

G. Lu, and S. Debray, "Automatic simplification of obfuscated JavaScript
code: A semantics-based approach," in IEEE Sixth International
Conference on Software Security and Reliability (SERE) (pp. 31-40), June
2012.

[41]

W. Xu, F. Zhang, and S. Zhu, "JStill: Mostly static detection of obfuscated
malicious JavaScript code," in proceedings of the third ACM conference
on Data and application security and privacy (pp. 117-128), February 2013.

[42]

X. Dong, M. Tran, Z. Liang, and X. Jiang, "AdSentry: Comprehensive and
flexible confinement of JavaScript-based advertisements," in proceedings
of the 27th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (pp. 297306), December 2011.

[43]

A. Dewald, T. Holz, and F.C. Freiling, "ADSandbox: Sandboxing
JavaScript to fight malicious websites," in proceedings of the 2010 ACM
Symposium on Applied Computing (pp. 1859-1864), March 2010.

119

[44]

H. Mekky, R. Torres, Z.-L. Zhang, S. Saha, and A. Nucci, "Detecting
malicious http redirections using trees of user browsing activity," in IEEE
Conference on Computer Communications, 2014.

[45]

S. Ford, M. Cova, C. Kruegel, and G. Vigna, "Analyzing and detecting
malicious Flash advertisements," in ACSAC (pp. 363-372), December 2009.

[46]

Z. Li, K. Zhang, Y. Xie, F. Yu, and X. Wang, "Knowing your enemy:
understanding and detecting malicious web advertising," in ACM
Conference on Computer and Communications Security, 2012.

[47]

V. Rastogi, R. Shao, Y. Chen, X. Pan, S. Zou, and R. Riley, "Are these ads
safe: Detecting hidden attacks through the mobile app-Web interfaces,"
2016.

[48]

S. Arshad, A. Kharraz, and W. Robertson, "Include me out: In-browser
detection of malicious third-party content inclusions," in proceedings of
International Conference on Financial Cryptography, 2016.

[49]

L.Y. Njilla, N. Pissinou, and K. Makki, "Game theoretic modeling of
security and trust relationship in cyberspace," International Journal of
Communication Systems, 29(9), pp.1500-1512, 2016.

[50]

C.A. Kamhoua, M. Rodriguez, and K.A. Kwiat, "Testing for hardware
trojans: A game-theoretic approach," in International Conference on
Decision and Game Theory for Security (pp. 360-369), Springer
International Publishing, November 2014.

[51]

A. Bensoussan, M. Kantarcioglu, and S.C. Hoe, "A game-theoretical
approach for finding optimal strategies in a botnet defense model," in
International Conference on Decision and Game Theory for Security (pp.
135-148), Springer Berlin Heidelberg, November 2010.

[52]

M.H.R. Khouzani, S. Sarkar and E. Altman, "A dynamic game solution to
malware attack," in proceedings of IEEE INFOCOM (pp. 2138-2146), April
2011.

[53]

B. Soper, and J. Musacchio, "A botnet detection game," in IEEE 52nd
Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing
(Allerton), September 2014.

120

[54]

G. Gianini, M. Cremonini, A. Rainini, G.L. Cota, and L.G. Fossi, "A game
theoretic approach to vulnerability patching," in IEEE International
Conference on Information and Communication Technology Research
(ICTRC) (pp. 88-91), May 2015.

[55]

Accuracy, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Accuracy_and_precision.

[56]

F1 Score, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/F1_score.

[57]

Matthews
Correlation
Coefficient,
Matthews_correlation_coefficient.

[58]

VirusSign, http://www.virussign.com.

[59]

SourceForge, http://www.sourceforge.net.

[60]

J.A. Morales, S. Xu, and R. Sandhu, "Analyzing malware detection
efficiency with multiple anti-malware programs," in proceedings of
ASE/IEEE International Conference on BioMedical Computing, December
2012.

[61]

J. Oberheide, E. Cooke, and F. Jahanian, "CloudAV: N-version antivirus in
the network cloud," in proceedings of 17th USENIX Security Symposium,
2008.

[62]

M. Cukier, I. Gashi, B. Sobesto, and V. Stankovic, "Does malware detection
improve with diverse antivirus products? An empirical study," in
proceedings of 32nd International Conference on Computer Safety,
Reliability and Security (SAFECOMP), 2013.

[63]

A-D. Schmidt, R. Bye, H.-G. Schmidt, J. Clausen, O. Kiraz, K.A. Yuksel,
S.A. Camtepe, and S. Albayrak, "Static analysis of executables for
collaborative malware detection on Android," in proceedings of IEEE
International Conference on Communications (ICC'09), 2009.

[64]

C.J. Fung, D.Y. Lam, and R. Boutaba, "A decision making model for
collaborative malware detection networks," Technical Report: CS-2013-01,
School of Computer Science, University of Waterloo, Canada, 2013.

[65]

C.J. Fung, D.Y. Lam, and R. Boutaba, "Revmatch: A decision model for
collaborative malware detection," Technical Report CS-2013-01,
Department of Computer Science, University of Waterloo, 2013.

121

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/

[66]

C. Silva, P. Sousa, and P. Verissimo, "Rave: Replicated antivirus engine,"
in proceedings of IEEE International Conference on Dependable Systems
and Networks Workshops (DSN-W), pages 170–175., 2010.

[67]

M. Marchetti, M. Messori, and M. Colajanni, "Peer-to-peer architecture for
collaborative intrusion and malware detection on a large scale,"
Information Security, pages 475–490, 2009.

[68]

M. Colajanni, D. Gozzi, and M. Marchetti, "Collaborative architecture for
malware detection and analysis," in proceedings of the 23rd International
Information Security Conference, The International Federation for
Information Processing (IFIP),Volume 278,pp 79-93, 2008.

[69]

H. Lu, X. Wang, and J. Su, "SCMA: Scalable and collaborative malware
analysis using system call sequences," International Journal of Grid &
Distributed Computing, 2013.

[70]

Jotti, http://virusscan.jotti.org.

[71]

VirSCAN, http://www.virscan.org.

[72]

File2Scan, http://www.file2scan.net.

[73]

Metadefender, https://www.metadefender.com.

[74]

HerdProtect, http://www.herdprotect.com.

[75]

HitmanPro, http://www.surfright.nl/en/hitmanpro.

[76]

SecureAPlus, http://www.secureaplus.com/Main/index.php.

[77]

Multi-AV, http://multi-av.thespykiller.co.uk.

[78]

Emsisoft, http://www.emsisoft.com.

[79]

G Data, https://www.gdata-software.com.

[80]

B. Amidan, T. Ferryman, and S. Cooley, "Data outlier detection using the
Chebyshev theorem," in IEEE Aerospace Conference, 2005.

[81]

M. Amer, M. Goldstein, and S. Abdennadher, "Enhancing one-class
support vector machines for unsupervised anomaly detection," in

122

proceedings of ACM SIGKDD Workshop on Outlier Detection and
Description, 2013.
[82]

RapidMiner Studio, available at https://rapidminer.com/products/studio.

[83]

M. Breunig, H-P. Kriegel, R. Ng, and J.Sander, "LOF: Identifying densitybased local outliers," ACM sigmod record. Vol. 29. No. 2, 2000.

[84]

jNetPcap, available at http://jnetpcap.com.

[85]

Team Cymru IP to ASN Lookup v1.0, available at https://asn.cymru.com/.

[86]

I. Özçelik, and R. Brooks, "Deceiving entropy based DoS detection,"
Computers & Security 48 (2015): 234-245.

[87]

Alexa top sites, available at http://www.alexa.com/topsites.

[88]

D. Ashley, "An algorithm for HTTP bot detection," University of Texas at
Austin – Information Security Office, January 2011.

[89]

F. Brezo et al., "A supervised classification approach for detecting packets
originated in a HTTP-based botnet," CLEI Electronic Journal, Volume 16,
Number 03, Paper 02, December 2013.

[90]

C. Chen, M. Huang, and Y. Ou, "Detecting Web-based botnets with fastflux domains", in Advances in Intelligent Systems and Applications,
Volume 2, Springer, 2013, pp 79-89.

[91]

T. Cai, and F. Zou, "Detecting HTTP botnet with clustering network
traffic," in proceedings of 8th International Conference on Wireless
Communications, Networking and Mobile Computing (WiCOM), 2012.

[92]

K. Yamauchi, Y. Hori, and K. Sakurai, "Detecting HTTP-based botnet
based on characteristic of the c&c session using by SVM," in proceedings
of 8th Joint Conference on Information Security, 2013.

[93]

G. Venkatesh, V. Srihari, R. Veeramani, R. Karthikeyan, and R. Anitha,
"HTTP botnet detection using hidden semi–Markov model with SNMP
MIB variables," in International Journal of Electronic Security and Digital
Forensics, Volume 5, Number 3–4/2013, January 2014.

123

[94]

S. Mathew, A. Ali, and J. Stephen, "Genetic algorithm based layered
detection and defense of HTTP botnet," in ACEEE International Journal on
Network Security , Vol. 5, No. 1, January 2014.

[95]

A. Zarras, A. Papadogiannakis, R. Gawlik, and T. Holz, "Automated
generation of models for fast and precise detection of HTTP-based
malware," In IEEE 12th Annual International Conference on Privacy,
Security and Trust (PST), 2014.

[96]

G. Gu, J. Zhang, and W. Lee, "BotSniffer: Detecting botnet command and
control channels in network traffic," in proceedings of the 15th Network
and Distributed System Security Symposium (NDSS), February 2008.

[97]

G. Gu, R. Perdisci, J. Zhang, and W. Lee, "BotMiner: Clustering analysis of
network traffic for protocol- and structure-independent botnet detection,"
in proceedings of the 17th Conference on Security Symposium, USENIX
Association, Berkeley, CA, USA, 2008.

[98]

G. Gu, P. Porras, V. Yegneswaran, M. Fong, and W. Lee, "BotHunter:
Detecting malware infection through IDS-driven dialog correlation," in
proceedings of 16th USENIX Security Symposium on USENIX Security
Symposium. USENIX Association: California, 2007.

[99]

W. Lu, G. Rammidi, and A. Ghorbani, "Clustering botnet communication
traffic based on N-gram feature selection," Journal of Computer
Communications, Volume 34, Issue 3, March 2011, Pages 502–514.

[100] P. Wurzinger, L. Bilge, T. Holz, J. Goebel, C. Kruegel, and E. Kirda
"Automatically generating models for botnet detection," 14th European
Symposium on Research in Computer Security (ESORICS'09), 2009.
[101] W. Strayer, R. Walsh, C. Livadas, and D. Lapsley, "Detecting botnets with
tight command and control," in proceedings of the 31st IEEE Conference
on Local Computer Networks, 2006.
[102] M. Reiter, and T. Yen, "Traffic aggregation for malware detection," in
Detection of Intrusions and Malware, and Vulnerability Assessment, vol.
5137/2008, Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Springer: Berlin, 2008, pp
207–227.
[103] J. Estevez-Tapiador, P. Garcia-Teodoro, and J. Diaz-Verdejo, "Measuring
normality in HTTP traffic for anomaly-based intrusion detection," in
124

Journal of Computer Networks, Volume 45, Issue 2, June 2004, Pages 175–
193.
[104] Y. Xie, S. Tang, X. Huang, and C. Tang, "Modeling Web session for
detecting pseudo-HTTP traffic," in Journal of Computer, Vol. 8 No. 2,
2013.
[105] Y. Song, A. Keromytis, and S. Stolfo, "Spectrogram: A mixture-of-Markovchains model for anomaly detection in Web traffic," in proceedings of
Network and Distributed System Security Symposium, February 2009.

125

